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Development of Federated Identity Management Systems (FIMS) has taken serious flight in
recent  years.  Enterprises  are  no  longer  operating  in  isolation  in  their  online  identity
management, but are increasingly realising that they can build 'circles of trust' and depend on
identities  provided  by  others  as  well  as  by  identification,  authentication,  and  potentially
authorisation, provided by others and they are willing to provide the same services to their
competitors  and  allies.  The  benefits  of  Federated  Identity  Management  Systems  for
enterprises is relatively clear: each member of the federation wins by not having to set up an
entire identity ecosystem and they can ride free on the reputation of others.
FIMS also have potential benefits for the customer, citizen and other kinds of individual end
user. Usually, FIM incorporates a single set of credentials that allow the individual to use
single sign-on to access services provided by different service providers. This may limit the
number of username/password combinations the user has to manage and remember. 
Identity management is more than access control to resources, which is the driving reason for
enterprises to engage in FIM. Individuals also engage in identity management. They play
different roles in life, both offline as well as online, and provide different 'faces' of themselves
in these roles and therefore use different partial identities. I am not only a legal academic
scholar with a strong interest in privacy and identity management, but also partner of my
spouse, compulsive gadget shopper, builder of autonomous lawn mowers, etc. I want to keep
these spheres separate. Not everyone needs to know about my shopping habits and affection
for autonomous robots. How does this (socially inspired) perspective relate to the enterprise
access control to resources perspective?
This deliverable tries to provide an initial answer to this question by developing requirements
and metrics to assess FIMS from a user perspective and applying these to a set of existing
FIMS.
The document first provides a brief overview of the developments in the identity management
landscape.  It  describes  how  an  evolution  from  enterprise  centric  identity  silos,  towards
federated identity management, and more recently towards user-centric identity management
can be observed. Next it provides a working definition of   Federated Identity Management
(Systems). 
Chapter three provides a brief justification why we focus our attention in this deliverable on
Liberty Alliance, Shibboleth, PRIME, and Microsoft Cardspace, while we could equally have
picked other initiatives and systems. The main reason is that these four represent a balanced
mix  of  enterprise  centric  approaches  Liberty  and  Shibboleth),  user  centric  approaches
(PRIME, Cardspace), and a large vendor backed approach (Cardspace).
Chapter  four  elaborates  on  the  individual  (end-user/customer)  perspective  on  FIM.  The
chapter   argues that audience segregation and role playing, convenience and usability, and
security are key concerns from this perspective. 
Chapter five translates these concerns into specific requirements and metrics that allows the
four FIM frameworks to be compared and assessed. An important starting point for assessing
the various frameworks is informational self control, both as a goal in itself (to promote and
protect autonomy), as well as a instrument to protect individual privacy. Secondly, as identity
management, required for access control to resources at least, for many people is not an aim
in itself, but rather a means to achieve other goals, we take into account a set of customer
adoption requirements. Next, a set of more technical aspects regarding the management of
File: 20090506_fidis_D3.12 final 1.0.odt page 10(partial)  identities  is  distinguished,  including  authentication  management,  policy
management,  history  management,  context  detection  and  personal  data  storage.  Finally,
security on the different levels completes the set of tangible requirements. 
Chapter six provides an extensive discussion of the four frameworks along the lines of the
requirements which is too extensive to summarize here. 
Chapter seven provides a summary of the most salient aspects of the four frameworks as well
as a number of comparative observations. 
What  clearly  shows  when  looking  at  the  four  frameworks  differ  significantly  in  their
approach, focus and maturity. Liberty Alliance and Shibboleth start from an enterprise centric
approach, in  Liberty's case a federation of enterprises, in Shibboleth's case institution(s) of
higher education. The enterprise is the principal party in providing and managing identities.
The individual is the (passive) user. PRIME and to a lesser extent CardSpace depart from the
perspective of the user as the central actor. Here the individual is really at the steering wheel
of her identity management. Both systems allow the user to self create identities, as well as
make use of provisioned, certified identities. The user-centricity also shows in the way users
can define and negotiate policies regarding personal data disclosure and use.
Liberty  and  Shibboleth  already  have  an  extensive  user  base  and  Cardspace,  given  its
Microsoft roots is in an advantageous position. PRIME, which started as a European research
project and hence focused on pushing (privacy) envelopes in this respect lags behind. There is
no off the shelf PRIME implementation.
1 
Liberty and Shibboleth don't require any download and/or installation on the part of the user.
Liberty is a set of standards that can be implemented by technology providers (on the server-
side of transactions). Shibboleth consists of a package that can be installed on the service
providers  IT  infrastructure.  Both  systems  provide  the  user  with  web  based  authentication
tools. PRIME depends on client and server Middleware for its advanced functionality. This
may  be  an  obstacle  to  widespread  deployment  and  adoption.  Cardspace  also  depends  on
Middleware, but in this case it is tied in major operating systems (Vista and Windows 7),
which facilitates large scale adoption. 
With  respect  to  security  there  are  many  similarities  because  most  systems  use  the  same
underlying mechanisms (SAML), which means they are prone to the same risks. Regarding
trustworthiness  from  the  perspective  of  the  user  there  are  significant  differences.  Liberty
Alliance has to rely on the reputation of a potentially diverse large set of identity providers,
which may be unfamiliar to the user, as well as relying parties of different stature. Shibboleth
currently is mainly implemented in configurations where the user knows the identity provider
(his/her university or school) as well as the relying parties which facilitates the trust relation.
Trustworthiness in PRIME has different aspects. On the one hand, identity is very much in the
hands  of  the  user  herself  (which  should  be  trustworthy).  Also,  sophisticated  technology
(cryptography,  anonymous  communication)  should  enhance  the  (technical)  trust  level
significantly  over  other  approaches,  yet  trustworthiness  here  is  undermined  because  the
technology is opaque and unfamiliar to most common users. Do they trust technology they
don't  understand?  Cardspace  shares  PRIME's  approach  to  user-control.  Both  rely  on
decentralised storage, which could benefit user trust in the system.
1 Although the PRIME follow-up project PrimeLife (visit http://primelife.eu) may change this.
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2.1 Scope of this document
This  document  is  directed  to  an  audience  of  academics,  EU  policy-makers,  experts  from
technological,  social  science  and  legal  disciplines  and  interested  citizens.   Purpose  of  this
deliverable  is  to  describe  federated  IdM  and  what’s  in  it  for  the  end-user,  by  means  of
defining relevant concepts and metrics with which we can compare the various IdM projects
with  respect  to  privacy  and  user  control.  Its  focus  lies  on  the  interests  of  citizens  and
consumers.   It  contains  an  overview  of  a  number  of  the  existing  federated  identity
management systems.
2.1.1 IdM evolution
2
Individuals are right at the center of online identity management, because it concerns the
management  of  their  identities,  and  because  decisions  are  made  on  the  basis  of  these
identities. From an individual's point of view, the concept of identity management therefore
not only relates to the access control regarding resources. It also, or maybe even rather, relates
to how they are manifested and represented, and how this is aligned to their own perception of
their  identity.  Identity  management  in  this  sense  strongly  relates  to  role  playing  and
presentation of self. Individuals should be able to act as autonomous individuals, be able to
control their reputation, and have insight in the way they are judged by others in a specific
context. The online environment facilitates the construction and maintenance of projected and
imposed personae. Data can easily be collected and combined into rich personae, transcending
the context in which individual bits of information were disclosed. The decontextualisation
and combination of data from different sources makes it difficult for individuals to control
their different digital personae. This undermines the capabilities for people to control the
image they present in different contexts and to segregate audiences online. The need to do so
exists online just as it does offline. People engage in different kinds of activities online (e.g.
public, commercial, and intimate) and need to be able to construct matching identities that
meet the behavioural rules and requirements set by these different environments. Important
values such as reputation, dignity, autonomy, judgement, and choice are closely related to the
individual perspective on identity management. When people cannot determine or control
their  identity,  they  may  become  overexposed,  confused,  or  discriminated,  for  example.
Human beings have an interest in naming and sorting themselves (Gandy 1993; Raab 2005)
and to play different roles. Sometimes they may even need to be anonymous and unidentified
(e.g.  for  purposes  of  emotional  release,  relaxation,  unpunished  criticism,  and  making
mistakes). Individuals appreciate to have a diverse and autonomous life, and need to be able
to adapt their identities to the environment they engage in. Even though identity management
is not usually the primary goal of the individual, which may explain why many people are not
eager to invest time and money in IdM systems (Dhamija  2008), the social values outlined
previously warrant the individual perspective to be taken into account in the development of
IdM systems.
2.1.2 From identity-‘silo’s’ to federation
Different  models  for  online  identity  management  have  been  developed  in  recent  history.
Traditionally, identities were managed in so-called corporate identity silos. In this model one
single identity management environment is operated by a single service for a specific group of
2  This section is based on the author's contribution to part 1 of the PRIME book (PRIME 2009).
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own requirements for authorisation and identification of individuals. From the perspective of
users of multiple systems this means that they have to maintain an identity (account) for each
and every service they use, which in practice means several sets of passwords and usernames.
The  "silo-model"  is  still  a  dominant  model  for  identity  management  on  the  internet. An
obvious drawback of this scheme from the perspective of the users are that it requires them to
provide the same (personal) information for every new online service. The construction of
identities in these systems is guided by rules (implicitly) set by the provider of the service.
Each account is identified by an identifier. Sometimes these identifiers can be freely chosen,
sometimes they have to satisfy certain rules (e.g., at least one number, 8 characters long), or
be  a  valid  email  address.  Individuals  are  therefore  sometimes  forced  to  create  different
identities (or rather the identifiers that identify the identity) even when they want to use the
same identity across domains. Or, in the case of being obliged to use a valid email address,
they may have to use identities they don't want to use for a particular use. As a result of these
practices two effects on identity construction are visible: one, difficult to remember identifiers
as a result of the rules on identifiers imposed by the service provider, and two a convergence
of identities to a limited set of partial identities as a result of the requirement to use email
addresses  as  "usernames".  Furthermore,  the  "silo"-approach  has  resulted  in  many  identity
"one-offs" and an ad-hoc nature of internet identity even though the identities in these silo's
can be managed by, for instance, storing passwords and usernames in software (password-
managers) on a local computer or on a server (Olsen 2007; Cameron 2005).
A  next  step  in  the  development  of  IdM  systems  has  been  the  development  of  single
organisation single sign-on (SOSSO)(Olsen 2007). Here individuals gain access to different
resources (applications, web sites) within a single entity's domain once they are authenticated.
Well  known  in  this  domain,  and  underlying  many  current  systems  ranging  UNIX
implementations to the Windows Domain/Active Directory architecture, is Kerberos. This
computer network authentication protocol developed at MIT as early as the beginning of the
1980s, makes use of a trusted third party, termed a key distribution center (KDC), which
consists of two logically separate parts: an Authentication Server (AS) and a Ticket Granting
Server (TGS). Kerberos works on the basis of "tickets" which serve to prove the identity of
users. 
SOSSO systems, in general, slightly alleviate the individual's burden of having to cope with
potentially different identities within such a domain. Usually it also limits the individual's
capabilities to use different identities within a certain domain (e.g., the association of an
account to an email address limits the number of accounts an individual can establish without
also obtaining new email addresses). Effects of SOSSO are the collapse of different (social)
contexts within a given domain controlled by the enterprise and linkability because the IdM
provider can recognize the individual access to the various resources. SOSSO makes coping
with  enterprise  centric  IdM  easier  for  the  individual  within  a  particular  domain  (e.g.,
company), but does not help when multiple domains are involved.
Multi-organisation single sign-on (e.g., Microsoft .Net Passport) aims to solve this problem,
as  well  as  lessen  the  burden  of  implementing  and  maintaining  IdM  systems  within  each
enterprise in a federation (Olsen 2007). In this model, authentication is outsourced to a trusted
identity provider (IdP). The IdP identifies and authenticates the user and provides a credential
that can be used to access resources from associated service providers. Drawbacks of this
model  are  that  the  IdP  stores  the  user's  data  which  creates  security  vulnerabilities.
Furthermore,  the  attendance  of  one  single  IdP  in  all  interactions  on  the  Internet  creates
linkability  because  the  IdP  can  trace  the  user  after  authentication.  It  also  creates  a
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in all transactions.
Enterprise  centric  federated  identity  management  (e.g.,  Liberty  Alliance)  addresses  the
problems related to the dependence on a single IdP in a federation, by allowing any number of
IdPs to handle authentication. The user authenticates with any of the IdPs in the federation
and subsequently cab access resources at each of the entities in the federation (where the user
has proper authorisations). Some federation schemes not only handle authentication, but also
allow  the  transfer  of  attributes  between  the  federates  (Olsen  2007).  Federated  identity
schemes again limit the burden for individuals of having to cope with multiple identities when
they want to use a single identity, but do not address the needs of individuals when they want
to use different identities for different activities in the federation. The advantages mainly
benefit the enterprises which can achieve costs savings arising from a shared scheme based on
a standardised, interoperable architecture, and the outsourcing of authentication and IdM to
professional identity providers. Federated IdM systems also increase convenience for the user
to make use of several different services and make identities portable. Furthermore, they can
create opportunities for organisations to ease the process of registration, authentication, and
authorisation. In addition, these systems allow for cost saving on the retention and collection
of data and can create new business opportunities (see: Olsen 2007).
2.1.3 A definition of Federated IdM
Identity federation is based on a conceptual separation between service providers (SP) and
identity  providers  (IdP)  and  concerns  the  arrangements  that  are  made  among  several
organisations and individuals, that let entities use the same sets of identification data, to get
access (and authorisation) to the several different (otherwise autonomous) services offered by
all the organisations associated with the system of federation. Hence, identity federation aims
to make digital (or electronic-) identities usable in different domains. This entails mutual trust
establishment between “secured domains of control” which might be associated with different
organizations. The  cross-domain  identification  and  authorization  of  users  based  on  single
“federated identities” allows those users to seamlessly access services in different domains.
On the other hand, it avoids unnecessary redundant user administration by several systems.
An important aspect of FIM is that not necessarily one specific Identity provider is needed.
From that point of view federated identity management systems can be understood as a trust
relationship between so far separate identity management domains and related systems.
Identity federation is a broad concept. It can relate to systems with both a high level of
security as to systems with a low level of security. Moreover, federated IdM systems come in
the form of user-controlled systems, but are usually controlled by businesses or governments
(as in the Dutch DigiD case). In addition, FIM-systems can be ‘token-based’ or ‘anonymous-
credential-based’, meaning that some systems rely on the mediation of Identity Providers
(IdP) between Relying party (Rp) and the user, whereas other systems let the user construct
her identity out of anonymous credentials. 
However,   FIM-systems have in common that agreements, policies, and standards are used to
make identities portable. Also, they often rely on schemes of Single-Sign-On (SSO), even
though  credentials  and  identities  may  be  stored  at  different  locations,  under  different
conditions. 
Combinations of the following features are provided by federated identity management:
File: 20090506_fidis_D3.12 final 1.0.odt page 14• Identity provisioning: Based on the registration to one service, respectively identity
provider, several services providers are able to generate accounts for that particular
user and based on this account to authenticate her.
• Single-Sign On: Based on a login to one service, respectively identity provider, the
user is also able to user her existing accounts for other service providers.
• Attribute exchange: The linkage of several attributes of the user to one digital identity
in the domain of one service, respectively identity provider, could be requested from
other service providers as well, at least under certain conditions. The exchange of
attributes also facilitates authorisation.
From the user’s point of view federated IdM makes it more convenient for the user to gain
access  to  several  services.  It  relieves  her  from  the  burden  of   remembering  and  utilising
several account names and passwords, for example. Furthermore, FIM can be beneficial for
professional organisations, because data storage and identity distribution can be made more
efficient. Moreover, FIM makes it possible to outsource storage of data and provision of
identities. Besides these advantages of federated IdM there exist also challenges with regard
to privacy and security issues for users’ personal data as well as the security goals of the
organisations taking part in the federation.
2.1.3.1 Holistic approaches and stand alone technologies 
With respect to federated identity management initiatives abound, both on a detailed level as
on a conceptual, holistic level. Some systems are developed for a particular area, such as
education (such as Aselect for Dutch universities
3), or (Dutch) public sector (such as DigiD
4)
and (intentionally) have limited applicability. Other systems are intended for large audiences
and multiple settings, such as Microsoft Cardspace and Liberty Alliance. In this deliverable
we will limit ourselves to the latter, more general systems.
2.1.3.2 What is outside the scope of federation
In recent years a shift from an enterprise centric view to a user-centric view can be observed.
Notions, such as `Identity 2.0' (Sxip, Microsoft Cardspace, Higgins, PRIME, etc) belong in
this sphere. In these initiatives the IdP is no longer in the centre of issuing and creating
identities, but rather the user is. In user-centric identity management the individual's interests
are  acknowledged  in  the  sense  that  they  manage  their  own  personal  data  and  obtain
credentials  from  identity  providers  which  they  can  use  in  their  interaction  with  service
providers. Systems based on anonymous credentials even give the user and relying party the
opportunity to use identity attributes without the use of a central identity provider (PRIME
2008c). Such systems make it possible to really put the user at the center of IdM, and thus
indicates a shift from an enterprise-centric perspective to a user-centric perspective. The user-
centric model provides the user more control over the way they present themselves to others.
If designed properly, they assure the necessary level of privacy in the online environment.
Although many developments regarding user centric identity management take place, genuine
user  centric  solutions  that  offer  full  support  for  partial  identity  management  are  not
widespread  yet.  Also  take  into  account  that  federated  identity  management  does  not
necessarily provide support for different pseudonyms or different partial identities. The core
feature  of  federated  identity  management  is  building  on  already  existing  trust  within  a
federation.
3 See http://a-select.surfnet.nl/
4 See http://digid.nl/
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First, we will provide an overview of the systems to be assessed in this deliverable including
their background and characteristics. Next a description of the end-user view on IdM will be
provided. This overview results in a list of concepts and metrics to be used for assessing the
different systems. The main part of the document consists of the actual assessment. Finally
some conclusions are provided in the final chapter. 
2.3 Relation with other documents
The FIDIS project has produced several deliverables related to identity management systems
and that should be consulted to get an overall picture on (federated) identity management.
Notable FIDS deliverables are
• D8.3: Database on Identity Management Systems and ID Law in the EU
This document consists of two parts. Part A puts forward a structure for a database of
Identity  Management  Systems  (IMS).  Two  designs  for  a  database  are  laid  out:  a
prototype with 29 fields (section 3) and an extended version with a total of 138 fields
(section  4).  The  prototype  has  been  implemented  and  is  accessible  online  at
http://www.jrc.es/projects/ims/imsintrodb.cfm.  This  document  also  includes  a  user
manual  (section  5)  and  the  technical  specifications  for  the  database  (section  6).
Records will continue to be added to the database of IMS over the coming months and
the document describes the next steps in the development process.
Part B introduces a database of ID laws, the Identity Law Survey (IDLS). Section 8
provides the context, and section 9 presents the initial structure of the law survey used
to build a prototype, available at   http://rechten.uvt.nl/idls/. Sections 10-11 outline a
revised database structure, and sections 12-14 provide the interface requirements, user
manual,  and  maintenance  plan.  The  aim  is  to  develop  a  simple  and  user-friendly
database, providing the public with basic information and knowledge on ID-related
laws in the EU and North America.
• D3.1: Overview on IMS
This document   provides an   overview of existing identity management systems (IMS).
Different types, classes and subclasses of IMS are identified, described and illustrated
by examples of existing IMS. To get an overview of the variety of existing technical
implementations  different  designs  of  IMS  are  presented.  Privacy  enhancing
mechanisms are developed and selected corresponding privacy enhancing technologies
(PET)  are  shown  as  examples  of  existing  implementations  of  those  mechanisms.
Finally an overview is presented of current research and development activities on
IMS and conclusions, especially from the FIDIS Network of Excellence.
• Independent Centre for Privacy Protection (ICPP) & Studio Notarile Genghini (SNG):
Identity Management Systems (IMS):
This  report  presents  a  multidisciplinary  framework  for  privacy-enhanced  identity
management (IdM), which includes technical, legal and sociological perspectives for
the definition of terms and presents usage scenarios. However, a major focus of the
ICPP/SNG  comparison  study  is  the  analysis  of  available  identity  management
applications and a survey on expectations with regard to identity management systems.
Outside  the  FIDIS  project  there  are  numerous  white  papers  and  papers  about  federated
identity management systems. These will be referenced in the text of the current deliverable.
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As mentioned in the introduction there are many federated identity management initiatives. In
this deliverable we can only address a couple: Liberty Alliance, Shibboleth, PRIME, and
Cardspace. Our choice is inspired on the following reasons. 
3.1 Liberty Alliance
The Liberty Alliance is a relatively old initiative regarding federated IdM. It was established
in 2001 by approximately 30 organizations to establish open standards, guidelines and best
practices for identity management. Today it continues to focus on these objectives, with a
global membership of more than 150 organizations, including technology vendors, consumer-
facing companies, educational organizations and governments from around the world, as well
as hundreds of additional organizations that participation in Liberty's various open community
Special Interest Groups (SIGs).
"The Liberty Alliance Project is an alliance formed to deliver and support a federated network
identity solution for the Internet that enables single sign-on for consumers as well as business
users in an open, federated way. [...] In a federated view of the world, a person's online
identity, their personal profile, personalised online configurations, buying habits and history,
and  shopping  preferences  are  administered  by  users,  yet  securely  shared  with  the
organisations of their choice. A federated network identity model will enable every business
or user to manage their own data, and ensure that the use of critical personal information is
managed and distributed by the appropriate parties, rather than a central authority. The role of
the Liberty Alliance Project in all of this is to support the development, deployment and
evolution of an open, interoperable standard for federated network identity. The vision of the
Liberty Alliance is to enable a networked world in which individuals and businesses can more
easily  conduct  transactions  while  protecting  the  privacy  and  security  of  vital  identity
information."
5
The Liberty project is relevant because it endorses (and sets) open standards and comprises a
large community of important ICT vendors and users.
3.2 Shibboleth
The Shibboleth®   System is a standards based, open source software package for web single
sign-on  across  or  within  organizational  boundaries.   The Shibboleth project was started in
2000 under the MACE (Middleware Architecture Committee for Education), which explains
the  popularity  of  Shibboleth  in  institutions  for  higher  education.   It  allows  sites  to  make
informed  authorization  decisions  for  individual  access  of  protected  online  resources  in  a
privacy-preserving manner.   The Shibboleth Project, one of the MACE-Internet2 Middleware
Initiatives, is developing architectures, policy structures, practical technologies, and an open
source implementation to support inter-institutional sharing of web resources subject to access
controls.
The  Shibboleth  software  implements  widely  used  federated  identity  standards,  principally
OASIS' Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), to provide a federated single sign-on
and attribute exchange framework. Shibboleth also provides extended privacy functionality
allowing  the  browser  user  and  their  home  site  to  control  the  attributes  released  to  each
application.  Using  Shibboleth-enabled  access  simplifies  management  of  identity  and
permissions for organizations supporting users and applications. Shibboleth is developed in an
5  http://www.projectliberty.org/.
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3.3 PRIME
The PRIME project, an EU and Swiss government funded FP 6 project,   aims  to   develop a
working prototype of a privacy-enhancing Identity Management System. Although PRIME
does not represent an existing solution on the market, it aims to push the technical envelope
regarding  privacy-enhancing   user-centric  identity  management  far  and  hence  represents  'a
standard' to which the other systems can be compared.
"The PRIME Architecture can be seen as a generic architecture   that deﬁnes a feasible way of
bringing multiple complementary technologies from the   privacy-enhancing technology (PET)
space together with the goal of improving the privacy protection for people that interact over
an electronic communication network such as the Internet.
The added value of PRIME with respect to systems developed by other initiatives   can be best
summarized as follows: 1) PRIME deﬁnes methods for establishing trust by   data exchange
between two parties in a semi-automated way; 2) PRIME strives to reduce   a user’s need in
excessive trust in other parties such as service providers or certiﬁers   regarding proper data
handling; 3) PRIME allows a user to make a semi-automated assessment of a service provider
that allows her to better judge the trustworthiness of   the service provider and thus to make a
better informed decision on the release of data;   4) PRIME provides new approaches to the
enforcement  of  agreed  data  handling  policies   with  a  greater  degree  of  expressivity  and
automation. 
The   establishment of trust   is performed by a mutual release of possibly certiﬁed   data between
two parties. The mutual release of data together with an agreement   of   data handling policies
that need to be applied on those data is called   negotiation.   The negotiation is to a large extent
driven by a new   access control policy   mechanism   developed in PRIME. The data handling
policies of PRIME comprise on the one hand   aspects that are enforceable by access control
and, on the other hand, aspects that   are unrelated to access control (privacy obligations). The
goal  of  a  negotiation  is  to   allow  both  involved  parties  to  establish   sufficient  trust  in  the
respective other party   by the provided attribute statements. A wide range of attributes are
considered useful   for establishing trust. Examples are certiﬁed attributes of persons (e.g., as
contained   in an electronic id card), attributes characterizing organizations (e.g., attributes in a
privacy seal), attributes characterizing the assurance state of a data processing system   (e.g.,
integrity, availability of certain enforcement mechanisms), attributes about the   reputation of a
party (in general their conduct in previous interactions). 
The   reduction of trust requirements   is one of the key goals of PRIME with the goal   of putting
the user in a better position, thereby reﬂecting strongly the   user-centric   approach   of PRIME
that  is  directly  implemented  in  the  architecture.  A  key  technology   for  reducing  trust
requirements is the use of advanced technologies for data exchange. 
PRIME  builds  on  top  of  a  powerful   anonymous  credential  system,  identity  mixer,  that
operates in a strong model for identity federation in terms of privacy. Such a system   allows a
service provider to authorize a user without necessarily establishing linkability   with other
authorizations of this user at this or other service providers. This reduces   the possibility of
excessive proﬁling of users by parties they interact with. 
A  user  can  assess  various  properties  of  a  service  provider  in  order  to  better  judge  the
trustworthiness of the service provider. The assessment is mainly based on   assurances   that the
service provider can communicate to the user on request. Those assurances   cover properties
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individual platforms. Particularly, the availability of certain   protection mechanisms, e.g., the
availability  of  a  PRIME  life-cycle  data  management   system,  can  be  asserted  to  users.
Reputation data   can serve as a useful data source for   a trust assessment of another (unkown)
party as well. 
The   enforcement of policies   for data once they have been released is taken further in the
PRIME  project  when  comparing  with  the  state  of  the  art  systems.  The  policies  we   are
referring to are the data handling policies that are agreed for data being released. 
The enforcement comprises two parts: The more traditional enforcement of   access control
constraints   using  advanced  policy  mechanisms  and  also  the  enforcement  of   privacy
obligations   by a new approach of automated enforcement of privacy obligations. The   latter
has  been  designed  speciﬁcally  with  performance,  scalability,  and  longevity  in  mind   for
practical viability."
6
3.4 Microsoft Cardspace
Microsoft's Cardspace is an initiative from one of the worlds largest software developers with
a very big user base. Any development by Microsoft therefore is bound to have an important
impact on the identity landscape. 
3.5 A brief comparison
The four contenders in this deliverable represent different aims, developers and scopes. 
Figure 1: The identity landscape in 2006 according to Johannes Ernst
(http://netmesh.info/jernst/Digital_Identity/three-standards.html)
Ernst, on his identity blog distinguishes three pillars of identity management systems in line
with the overview of IdM systems provided in the previous chapter. He exaggerates a bit in
the picture (see Figure 1), but the main gist seems valid:
“
1. The   company-controlled identity pillar, which is rooted in the Liberty standards.
This pillar is ready-made for corporate adoption: identity is "given" to the individual
by the corporation (e.g. the employer), and it is the corporation that decides which
identity attributes are managed and shared with whom. Even if the corporation gives
6  Dieter Sommer, Introduction to chapter 10: The PRIME architecture, The PRIME Book, 2009.
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not to give those choices to the individual.
2. The   "Microsoft"-controlled  identity  pillar.  I  have  put  quotes  around  Microsoft,
because on one hand, Microsoft of course does not control WS-* (at least not by itself)
which is a major component of this pillar. On the other hand, the adoption of this pillar
will be driven by Windows Vista and InfoCard adoption and the particular subset of
WS-* that Microsoft has chosen to support (unless of course, somebody built it into
Linux or all cell phones ... but so far, I have not heard about an announcement of this
kind, so I don't think I'm wrong to identify Microsoft as the major driver here)
3. The   user-controlled  identity  pillar,  where  the  individual  is  fully  in  control,  over
identity providers, over attributes, over whether or not to have an identity or how
many, over the software to run, and over the feature set associated with their identity.
It's most visible sign is the use of URLs to point to people, just like we use URLs to
point to companies or documents. This pillar is rapidly coming together in the   YADIS
community,  which  essentially  facilitates  an  open  marketplace  of  interoperable
identity-related features from which the individual may pick as many or as few as they
like.”
7
The enterprise pillar is represented in the current report by the Liberty Alliance (for enterprise
centric) and Shibboleth (for 'educational corporation' centric). The Microsoft controlled pillar
is represented by Microsoft Cardspace. The user controlled pillar is represented by PRIME.
3.6 Other systems
Higgins i s  an  open  source  framework  that  enables  users  and  other  systems  to  integrate
identity, profile, and relationship information across multiple heterogeneous systems. Higgins
unifies all identity interactions (regardless of protocol/format) under a common user interface
metaphor called i-cards. Higgins enables developers to write to a common API for Identity
management,  rather  than  needing  to  support  multiple  identity  management  systems
individually. Software applications written to Higgins will allow people to store their digital
identities and profile information in places of their choice and to share the stored information
with companies and other parties in a controlled fashion.
8
The   Bandit   project is an open source collection of loosely-coupled components to provide
consistent identity services. It implements open standard protocols and specifications such
that  identity  services  can  be  constructed,  accessed,  and  integrated  from  multiple  identity
sources.  Portions  of  the  identity  services  are  an  implementation  of  the  Higgins  trust
framework. The  Bandit  system  supports  many  authentication  methods  and  provides  user-
centric credential management. On this base of a common identity model, Bandit is building
additional services needed for Role Based Access Control RBAC and for the emission of
records to verify compliance with higher level policies.
9
OpenID  is  an  open,  decentralized  standard  for  user  authentication  and  access  control,
allowing users to log onto many services with the same digital identity. As such, it replaces
the common login process that uses a login-name and a password, by allowing a user to log in
once and gain access to the resources of multiple software systems.
7  http://netmesh.info/jernst/Digital_Identity/three-standards.html
8  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higgins_trust_framework
9  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandit_project
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provider' (that is, the entity hosting their OpenID URL). The OpenID protocol does not rely
on a central authority to authenticate a user's identity. Since neither the OpenID protocol nor
Web sites requiring identification may mandate a specific type of authentication, non-standard
forms of authentication can be used, such as smart cards, biometrics, or ordinary passwords.
OpenID authentication is used and provided by several large websites. Organizations like
AOL, BBC, Google, IBM, Microsoft, MySpace, Orange, PayPal, VeriSign, Yandex, Ustream
and Yahoo! act as providers.
10
10  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Openid
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ICT facilitated communications and transactions lack the characteristics of normal face-to-
face  contact.  Because  of  this,  individuals,  government,  and  private  enterprises  face  a
significant challenge in the online identification of themselves, and their transaction partners.
Especially when it is necessary to be certain about specific characteristics of each other, e.g.
for accountability or credibility, identity management systems are of key importance. 
Many identity management solutions are being developed by organisations, meeting their own
requirements for IdM systems
11, which, as we have seen already used to focus on access
control to their resources. Customers and citizens potentially have different and additional
requirements  because  they  interact  with  multiple  service  providers.  This  chapter  aims  to
provide  a  brief  end-user  perspective  on  identity  management  by  describing  the
customer/citizen  point  of  view  to  identity  and  identity  management,  followed  by  some
customer scenarios. 
4.1 Role playing and proving claims
In the online environment, identities are being used by customers for several purposes, like
gaining access to specific services or for making agreements with others. From an individual's
point  of  view  the  concepts  of  identity  and  identity  management  relate  to  more  than  just
getting access to services or proving who they are. Individuals may also relate the use of
digital  identities  to  how  they  present  themselves  to  others  and  how  the  resulting
representation is aligned to their own perception of self. Customers have an idea of ‘who they
really are’ (which idea is fluid and dynamic), but use several static representations
12 (partial
identities) of themselves throughout different contexts and relations.
13 Individuals   use several
different   partial identities throughout life for the sake of playing different roles in life, e.g., of
mother, citizen, employee, or consumer
14. These partial identities are   composed of different
attributes,  and   are  identified  by  (potentially  different)   identifiers  (e.g.,  different
usernames/passwords for different services).   To avoid confusion and deception, the individual
has  an  interest  in  aligning,  segregating,  and  controlling,  in  other  words  managing  their
different (partial) identities to maintain consistent relations with others and to synchronise the
static representations with her ‘real’ identity. 
It is important that one can effectively prove that the   attributes and identifiers   provided   are
valid and thus that the individual actually is who she claims to be (authentication). In the
offline world, proving claims is facilitated e.g., by means of the environment (e.g. where we
are), self-assigned characteristics (e.g., clothes, physical presence), and   credentials provided
by others (e.g., driving license, passport). For the online world, people also need means to
prove their claims   concerning their   identity.   In comparison to the offline world, this is more
challenging online,   because online we   usually   cannot use the   traditional   trust tokens, such as
our  passport
15,  and  because  roles  and  contexts  succeed  each   other  more  seamlessly  and
rapidly.  Moreover,  identities  are  easily  stored,  copied,   and   transferred,   which  facilitates
11 And may be concentrated on business processes instead of the user point of view. 
12 Which can be projected by the individual, but can also be imposed, see: Clarke (1994). 
13 FIDIS WP2. (2005). D 2.1: Inventory of topics and clusters (FIDIS Deliverables): FIDIS Consortium. Fidis
D 2.1.
14 Ibid. 
15 Some countries have issued smart-card based identity cards that allow individuals to substantiate their
claims. Examples are Spain, Italy, and Belgium. Germany is in the process of issuing a new ID card which
can also be used in electronic transactions. See http://www.bsi.bund.de/bsi/reden/20080821EICC_Erice.pdf
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16  
17. The rise of identity fraud in recent years   further   undermines
online   trust,  which m akes  it  even  harder  to  obtain  online  services  without  proper
authentication. At the same time, the need for implementing an end-user perspective in IdM
system increases: ICTs are being used for   an   increasing   number of   purposes, contexts,
18 and
applications
19.
The increasing  use  of  ICTs  in   several  contexts  has  increased  the  need  to   know how we
represent ourselves online and who we are interacting with. However, whereas role playing
and proving claims is obvious in the normal offline world, online identity management seems
to be more burdensome and less obvious to consumers. 
4.2 Convenience and usability
The online world can be a opaque and incomprehensible place for customers trying to manage
their digital identities. For example, one single online session may already require customers
to remember and fill-in several usernames (and passwords). Moreover, online services can
have extensive policies, requiring customers to scrutinise several statements (in a foreign
language, regulated by foreign legislation), before getting access to a service. For the end-
user, it is often an impossible task to remember in which circumstances and under what terms
they have used a service on the internet. Currently, registration or access to online services
often requires superfluous, but compulsory information disclosure (form filling). 
Online identity management introduces many hurdles for the end-user, which may lead to
users refraining from using certain services or online interaction at all. Online IdM systems
may  also  induce  the  end-user  to  behave  different  from  their  actual  preferences  (Berendt
2005). For example, extensive policies prevent customers to read these policies at all (Milne
2004), users forget which agreements they have previously made and they may provide false
data when personal data is requested. In addition, when applications are complex, customers
may choose to use the default settings, which may not necessarily correspond to their personal
preferences or their privacy interests. Ultimately, this can lead to customers making decisions
that are detrimental to their own interests (dhamija 2008). The complexity of the online world
may add difficulty for customers to actually understand why they should use an application or
service (Shostack 2003).
Online identity management is not what individuals care for when they interact with service
providers.  They  engage  in  online  transactions  for  the  sake  of  transactions,  the  IdM  is  a
necessary and unavoidable nuisance in many cases. Individuals often lack the interest, means,
time, or knowledge to manage their identities in a way that suits their interests. To avoid that
customers from engaging online interactions or make wrong decisions, it is important that
IdM  systems  take  into  account  the  usability  of  the  system,  its  default  settings,  and  the
eventual use of the system by customers. 
16 See FIDIS D 4.2 on identity fraud.
17 Cf. for example the phishing activity trends on www.antiphishing.org/, last visited August 11, 2008
18 Web 2.0. applications, which require more interaction, are being developed both in the field of social media
as for government and commercial services. 
19 We are moving to an ‘Internet of Things’: computing becomes ‘ubiquitous’ so that individuals in the future
may be supported by several devices that are connected to the internet. 
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Another  aspect  of  IdM  that  is  of  importance  to  both  organisations  and  consumers  is  the
security of IdM systems. However, motives and advantages for having secure IdM systems
differs for end-user and organisation. 
IdM systems need to ensure that personal information that is stored in these systems cannot be
obtained by unauthorised persons and organisations, for example for criminal purposes. Loss
of identity information can have serious consequences for the end-user. First of all, it may
lead to economic loss because some digital identities can be used to retrieve money from
credit card accounts and bank accounts. Even though a considerable amount of the economic
loss resulting from identity fraud is carried by businesses (Brody 2007), the costs in the end of
course befall to the customers themselves and even in the short run the individual can still be
significantly harmed economically. 
Also  other  adverse  effects  of  identity  misuse  incur  on  the  individual.  Identities  can,  for
instance,  be  abused  for  manipulation,  deception,  gossip,  or  bullying  (Donath  1998).
Inadequate security can also lead to reputational damage for the individual, for example when
sensitive information becomes available to a broader public or when lost identities are being
abused  for  criminal  purposes  (Solove  2007).  Repair  reputation  damage  is  difficult  even
because  it  may  be  difficult  to  detect  by  the  'victim'  and  because  removing  all  damaging
information may be extremely difficult in practice due to caches, copies, etc.
Identities are used as a basis of decisions and judgements, e.g. made by the government and
commercial  organisations  like  banks.  Identities  abuse  may  lead  to  discrimination  and
exclusion of services. In the worst case, this occurs without the awareness of the individual. In
addition, the burden of proof of undoing discrimination or exclusion lies at the individual,
which can require much effort.
Individuals also have an (indirect) interest in the security of IdM systems, because it may
increase the general trust in electronic services, and thus improve the possibilities to make use
of ICTs for communication and transactions. Trusted and secure IdM can pave the way for
more efficient and effective services to the end-user, whereas mass loss of personal data due
to insecurity will have a negative affect on the general use and supply of electronic services as
a whole.
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4.4 Scenarios
Individuals have to cope with many service providers in daily life, both offline and on-line.
One can not expect all these service providers to have relevant details about you when the
interaction starts, nor is this desirable as we have seen. But in certain situations we expect to
be  able  to  authenticate  (and  sometimes  identify)  once  for  different  transactions  and
interactions because we may have the impression that the multitude of service providers in
fact is a single entity or a conglomerate of related entities (a federation). In other occasions
entities that may appear unrelated to the individual in fact turn out to be related, either as part
of  a  whole,  or  as  part  of  a  federation.  The  following  scenarios  describe  these,  typical,
federated identity situations. They are taken from real life and describe the Dutch situation.
21
20 Like for instance the loss or mass amounts of personal data at the UK HRMC, or recently, or the recent theft
of 41 million credit card numbers, see:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/nov/21/immigrationpolicy.economy3 and
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/06/business/06theft.html (both last accessed August 11, 2008)
21 More scenarios and an analysis of identity in egovernment, ehealth, education and workplace, can be found
in PrimeLife HeartBeat 1.3.3 (June 2009). 
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Dutch students are clients of the   Informatie Beheer Groep (IB-groep). The IB-groep is the
Dutch government agency responsible for student grants administration and management of
related student and educational information. Until the early 2000s, the agency was heavily
criticised because of slow responses and bureaucratic delays. A strategic reorganisation with a
focus on Internet-based delivery of services had to solve these problems.
The IB-groep developed a unique authentication concept using mobile phones and SMS; this
channel was selected specifically because students often misplace electronic tokens or other e-
solutions, but generally do not lose their mobile phones. The SMS e-authentication concept
was offered to DigiD (see 4.4.2), and was subsequently adopted as the Dutch middle-level e-
authentication system.
After logging in with DigiD and SMS e-authentication, students have access to their personal
online portal (Mijn IB-groep) for student loans. The portal also grants access to different
processes  pertaining  to  school  and  higher  education  affairs  and  information.  Prospective
students  are  offered  options  to  search  databases,  find  courses,  and  apply  for  some
programmes.
The IB-groep therefore plays a central role in the life of students. However, when they want to
access services within their school or university, the IB-Groep is no longer in sight, although
it could play a role here. In other words, the IB-Groep is not, or only to a limited extent, part
of the 'education federation'
There  is  a  real  federation  in  the  educational  domain.  This  federation  is  facilitated  by
SURFnet, the Internet service provider for higher education and called the SURFfederation
23.
“The SURFnet Federation will ensure that users can prove their identity by making use of
data which this organisation (an educational institution), known as the Identity Provider (IdP),
issues and manages for this purpose. The point of departure is the privacy of the user. It is
therefore the task of the Identity Provider to determine the user’s identity, and to issue it to the
federation, in combination with a number of user characteristics, where appropriate.
In  turn,  the  SURFnet  Federation  ensures  that  information  and  service  providers  trust  the
information regarding this identity. This prevents users having to remember multiple login
names and access codes, and prevents the organisation having to maintain a large number of
technical connections to information and service providers.“
24
Within the SURFnet Federation authentication and authorisation data are exchanged based on
the SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) standard.  
25   The SURFnet Federation is an
identity provider based on A-Select technology. Organisations (institutions and other service
providers like publishers) can all become member individually.
26
Depending  on  the  purpose  of  the  connection  specific  attributes  are  provided  to  a  service
provider. Users in the SURFnet Federation (every student and employee of an institute of
higher education and universities) make use of their credentials (username and password)
provided by their school or university to obtain services within the federation. Within their
22 Based on Arnold Roosendaal's contribution to PrimeLife HB 1.3.3.
23 See: http://federatie.surfnet.nl (last visited: December 2008).
24 See: http://federatie.surfnet.nl/cms/content/view/16/1/lang,en/ (last visited: December 2008).
25 See: http://federatie.surfnet.nl/cms/content/view/96/57/lang,en/ (last visited: December 2008).
26 Valkenburg, Peter/Jurg, Peter (2007). Identity Management; omgaan met elektronische identiteiten, The
Hague: ICT Bibliotheek, p. 83. 
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own institute they can authenticate (and indeed identify) themselves within the federation. For
instance, members may download Journals from publishers, such as Elsevier ScienceDirect
on the basis of the same credentials. And also SURFspot, an online software shop run by
Surfnet that offers discounted software (such as Microsoft Office and Adobe Illustrator) on
the basis of a country wide license agreement with these publishers. 
Users are in most cases redirected to their own institute's A-select (the name of the underlying
authentication  system)  login  page  and  after  successful  login  are  redirected  to  the  service
provider. Depending on the service provider  attributes pertaining to the user are provided.
To the individual the scope of the federation is not at all clear. One might assume that all
services provided by one's own institute belong to the federation. Due to all sorts of reasons,
for instance technical, this is not the case and therefore users have different sets of credentials
within their own institute (the author has two sets: the 'SURFnet' credentials as well as a
Novell server set, which, for instance is used for email and file sharing. It is not always clear
which credentials are requested, which opens the door for identity fraud). Outside one's own
institute it is again not always clear that a service provider is part of the federation. Why
would  students,  for  instance,  assume  that  Elsevier  ScienceDirect  is  part  of  a  university
federation. Again the risks of identity fraud are lurking. It is easy to set up a site regarding
something that is remotely associated to (higher) education and spoof the A-select login page
to obtain user credentials that can be used for obtaining services. 
4.4.2 Doing business with government
In the Netherlands many governmental organisations (but far from all) are part of a federation
that is facilitated by GBO.Overheid. The federation is based on   DigiD. Associated relying
parties,  typically  public  administrations  such  as  municipalities,  redirect  users  for
authentication  to  GBO.overheid  which  authenticates  the  claimant  and  on  successful
authentication returns a BurgerServiceNummer (‘Citizen Service Number’ or BSN) to the
relying party. Claimants that want to obtain an electronic identity, apply for this identity at the
DigiD website, which is a service managed by a department of the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations, called ‘GBO.overheid’.
The DigiD service comprises three assurance levels and hence three different kinds of DigiD’s
can be obtained by the claimant. The first and second assurance levels are called ‘DigiD
basis’  and  ‘DigiD  middle’. The  third  level,  ‘DigiD  high’,  will  be  filled  in  by  the  Dutch
electronic Identity Card, called ‘eNIK’, which is currently under construction.
The DigiD basis level grants a claimant access on the basis of only a password and username.
For  most  electronic  services  this  assurance  level  is  regarded  sufficient. The  middle  level
provides a higher assurance and currently consists of session-specific login codes that are
provided  to  the  claimant  by  means  of  text  messages  on  their  mobile  phone  (SMS,  Short
Message Service). The high level of authentication (the eNIK card) will be based on PKI, but
this project is severely delayed.
The base and medium levels of DigiD consists of the BurgerServiceNummer (BSN), which is
a unique identifying number for citizens registered in the Municipal Registry. The BSN is
used  as  a  key  to  records  pertaining  to  individuals  in  other  Dutch  Authentic  Registries
(currently there are ten registries). One of these registries is the Municipal Registry, which
contains information about residents in a municipality, such as name, last name, marital status,
address, residence, and parents and children. 
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government services. DigiD is also used as a digital signature for tax purposes. When a citizen
needs to authenticate herself on a municipal website, she is redirected to the DigiD login page
and after successful authentication the DigiD site transfers the citizens BurgerServiceNumber
to the relying party. 
The basic infrastructure for the federation is in place, but all sorts of issues exist. One, not all
government  agencies  are  part  of  the  federation.  This  means  one  can  use  one's  DigiD  in
municipality  A,  but  not  in  B.  Secondly,  although  the  DigiD  is  personal,  some  service
providers, most notably the Tax Authority in 2006, have advised citizens to use someone
else's DigiD to complete a service (for instance filing a tax return). This example also shows
that delegation, which is a requirement in the public domain (for instance, many people:
elderly, businesses, do not file their own tax return, and therefore someone else needs to be
able to act as a proxy) is not taken into account in the design. 
4.4.3 Moving from work to leisure
An entirely different kind of scenario is one where the different kinds of partial identities
come  into  play.  I  have  a  work  related  identity  (my  professional  career,  publications,
colleagues) and several private identities (my hobbies, sports, family life, etc). Users engaging
in Web 2.0 applications (wiki's, blogs, social networks) will therefore typically engage on
different platforms. My professional life is represented on LinkedIn, while my hobby life is
represented on Myspace, web forums, such as RC-Technics and MacRumors, etc. Some of
these platforms make use of federated identity management solutions, most notably OpenID.
The user can use a single set of credentials to access these different platforms. Although it
certainly  is  convenient  not  having  to  remember  usernames  and  passwords  for  all  these
platforms, but being able to log-in using a single set of (OpenID) credentials, the question
here is whether it is sensible to use the same credentials in totally different domains. Using
one's  OpenID  credentials  for  work  and  private  related  platforms  introduces  issues  of
linkability  that  one  may  want  to  prevent.  The  alternative  would  be  to  maintain  different
(OpenID) identities, but this would diminish the advantage of federated IdM.
4.5 Conclusion
In  this  chapter  we  have  provided  a  high  level  overview  of  desirable  features  and
characteristics  of  federated  identity  management  systems  from  the  perspective  of  the
individual. We have focused on the need to be able to play different roles in life, also online,
and being able to keep these separated which requires identity management systems to move
away from formal identities (one's real name) towards token and claim based authentication.
Secondly, convenience and usability are important. People want to obtain services. Having to
log in or prove certain claims is a mere 'nuisance' on the road to these services. Finally,
security is an important aspect to keep in mind from the perspective of the user. IdM deals
with people's identities. These can be misused and abused. Security is also important from the
perspective of trust establishment and maintenance: only in an environment where a basic
level of trust exists between users and service providers can we have serious service delivery. 
The scenarios at the end of the chapter have shown that different kinds of federations exist
with different characteristics and (trust/security) issues. 
In the next chapter we will derive a number of concrete aspects to facilitate comparing the
four FIM frameworks selected in the previous chapter. 
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5.1 Introduction
In  order  to  assess  and  compare  the  four  identity  management  frameworks  from  the
perspective of the individual user, we need to have a set of concepts and metrics to guide
evaluation. For the purpose of this deliverable we have derived these from literature and the
PRIME project.
An important starting point for assessing the various frameworks is informational self control,
both as a goal in itself (to promote and protect autonomy), as well as an instrument to protect
individual  privacy.  Secondly,  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  that  identity  management,
required for access control to resources at least, for many people is not an aim in itself, but
rather a means to achieve other goals. This provides the source for a set of end-user adoption
requirements. Next, a set of more technical aspects regarding the management of (partial)
identities  can  be  distinguished,  such  as  authentication  management,  policy  management,
history  management,  context  detection  and  personal  data  storage.  Finally,  security  on  the
different levels need to be taken into account. 
5.2 Control over an identity through privacy
ICTs have the characteristic to separate the body from the interactions and transactions we
have with other people. This makes it difficult to establish trust between the end-user and the
organisation they interact with. Moreover, time and space have become irrelevant with the use
of ICTs. We can do business online irrespective the direct availability or attendance of others,
by using digital representations of ourselves (Lyon 2001). These digital representations, or
‘digital  persona’  are  constructed  out  of  identity  information  (Clarke  1994).  Identity
information can be used, transferred, and copied on a global scale, which can lead to the
existence  of  scattered  digital  identities  of  customers.  When  such  identities  are  abused,
forgotten, out of date, or combined, the end-user becomes vulnerable as this situation could
lead to, for example,   ‘identity deception’, ‘identity fraud’, ‘profiling’, ‘function creep’ or
‘overexposure’.  ICTs  and  digital  persona  make  the  individual  ‘transparent’  in  a  new  way
because  information  can  easily  flow  in  and  out  of  contexts  and  because  an  information
asymmetry can easily originate between the user of identity information and the person whom
a digital identity relates to. In other words, customers are not always aware of the use of their
digital identities by others (Hildebrandt 2006; Solove 2007).
Because  the  use  and  abuse  of  identities  in  the  online  world  can  have  far  reaching
consequences for the individual (and for society), it is important that the honest use of digital
identities  is  guaranteed.  Obviously,  IdM  systems  can  have  an  important  function  here.
27
Specifically this means that a level of privacy ought to be assured in the design of IdM
systems. Privacy and identity are closely connected concepts (hildebrandt 2006). Privacy, for
example,  has  been  defined  as  the  possibility  of  individuals  to  ‘build  identities  without
unreasonable constraints’, and to freely project these constructed identities to others (Agre
1997; Goffman 1957). Customers need to use different roles (and thus identities) throughout
contexts, to adjust contextual requirements (e.g. to have intimacy, autonomy, team play, and
consistency of a relation). And only when the individual can segregate her different identities
between contexts and audiences, will it be possible to adjust to the integrity of the context in
which she acts Goffman 1958; Nissenbaum 2004). When privacy is assured by IdM systems,
the individual can control the information with which she builds her own identities and can
27  Next to regulation, norms, and the market, cf. Lessig (1999).
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Informational control (or informational self determination) by the individual is considered to
be a major aspect of privacy (Fried 1968; Stalder 2002; Westin 1967), (especially in the
information society) and is considered a necessary feature of IdM systems (Cameron 2005). It
can be assured on the basis of the following requirements/metrics
28:  
1. The IdM system’s possibilities for providing ex post and ex ante information to the end-
user.
Control of the user over his identity starts with the information an IdM system provides to the
user prior to the deployment and construction of a digital identity. The system needs to create
end-user consciousness about data processing as to provide the ability to anticipate to data
processing.  Information  provisioning  contributes  to  the  perceived  fairness  of  a  data
processor/IdM system by establishing transparency. Information should, however, not only be
provided previous to data processing, but should also be provided   after identities have been
created or used. This relates to the circumstances in which an individual wants to inspect the
use and storage of digital identities, but for example also to the situations in which identities
are exchanged with other parties in the service chain.  
2. The possibilities for the end-user to choose an identity, and consent to – and confinement
of – the use of identities. 
The  importance  for  customers  to  segregate  audiences  results  in  the  necessity  to  choose
between the identities he or she uses in a certain context. Moreover, it is important that these
different identities are confined and thus are not blended or combined with other identities.
Next  to  the  choice  between  identities  and  the  confinement  of  the  use  of  these  IDs,  IdM
systems  need  to  (pro-actively)  ask  for  permission  to  use  an  identity,  to  make  the  data
processing  legitimate.  The  end-user,  moreover,  needs  to  be  able  to  define  by  herself  the
conditions under which organisations can make use of her identity (e.g. scope of use, length
of storage, and purposes of use).
3. Possibilities of alteration and deletion of used identity-information by the end-user. 
Customers that make use of digital identities may occasionally need to be able to delete their
online profile. Such a need for ‘forgetfulness’ is a default setting in the ‘offline world’ but not
in the online world (Blanchette & Johnson 2002). Next to this, it is important that people can
alter their digital identities and can correct these identities when they have made mistakes or
when  the  conception  of  their  identity  is  not  aligned  (anymore)  to  their  static  digital
representation.
29 In a sense, the requirement for end-user alteration and deletion follows from
the demand to have transparent data processing, because without an instrument for the end-
user to change errors and mistakes, information provisioning about the use of identities would
have limited value.
5.3 Customer adoption characteristics 
To the end-user, identity management is often not a target in itself but mostly a means to, for
example, get access to specific services. This means that the adoption of an IdM system by its
customers may follow the path of least resistance (Dhamija & Dusseault 2008). Users will not
28 Abstracted from: Kosta et al (2008); Jutla et al (2005).
29 This also relates as to how the ‘I’ can be aligned with the ‘implicit me’ and ‘explicit me’, cf. FIDIS WP2.
(2005). D 2.1: Inventory of topics and clusters (FIDIS Deliverables): FIDIS Consortium, p. 30
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30 Because of this, IdM
systems must pay attention to the adoption of IdM systems by customers. Especially for the
commercial  use  of  IdM,  it  is  likely  that  the  value  of  an  IdM  system  increases  as  more
customers adopt it
31. 
Federated IdM systems are driven by standardisation and a cross-contextual approach towards
IdM. Hence, in theory, these systems should be scalable. However, such scalability may be
business-oriented only (focused on exchange of identities by businesses), instead of being
end-user oriented. Because of this, we define a concept of end-user adoption, which aims at
assessing the FIM initiatives on the basis of some metrics that can indicate the likeliness of
end-user adoption:
1. Increasing trustworthiness of the system and its transaction partners
Trust establishment is a central feature of FIM systems, as the exchange of identifiers and
identity attributes obviously requires trust mechanisms between the organisations that join a
federation. However, the importance of trust establishment between the end-user and the FIM
system and its connected organisations should not be underemphasised. Bearing in mind that
on the internet “consumer trust is a key foundation for success” (Tan & Sutherland 2004), and
that in FIM systems trust needs to be established in all participants of the federation
32, it is
important that consumers are convinced that they are not harmed by the federation as a whole.
Of  course,  trust  is  a  social  and  cultural  matter,  but  some  markers  of  the  quality  of  the
federation,  the  reliability  of  its  technology,  and  its  measurements  against  risks,  need  to
provide the end-user insight in its trustworthiness. This counts especially for FIM systems, as,
due to their nature, federations will be as strong as their ‘weakest link’
33. Some examples of
measures that can establish trust are: seals, mutual authentication, external audits, information
provisioning, or dispute resolution mechanisms. 
2. Connection to the skill level of the users, social settings, efforts, and costs
Currently, it is likely that IdM systems will be adopted when they are easy to download,
install, and configure (Dhamija & Dusseault 2008). Bearing this in mind, it seems that IdM
systems that are integrated in an OS or browser have an advantage over IdM systems that
need  to  be  purchased  or  downloaded  separately  (Dhamija  &  Dusseault  2008).  Moreover,
when installed, IdM systems need to avoid that the customers are overwhelmed with identity-
related choices or warnings, which can lead to unforeseen effects (e.g. people clicking “OK”
to all requests) (Dhamija & Dusseault 2008). The user’s rationality is bounded (c.f., Acquisti
& Grossklags 2005), and excessive choices in the field of identity management do not always
lead to a desired outcome (Schwartz 2004). 
For the sake of usability, the interface of an IdM system needs to be easy to understand, but
should also provide insight in the normal line of operation (consistency), and ideally provides
concise and layered policies supported with tutorials. It is a challenge for IdM systems and for
the  federations  in  which  they  are  used  to  provide  these  features  without  making  identity
management  a  burdensome  experience.  Because  of  this,  choices  in  the  field  of  human-
computer  interaction  (HCI)  can  should  support  the  user  and  need  to  make  the  system
30 Ibid.
31 In other words, a successful FIM system can create a ‘network effect’, because the more users and
organisations join the federation, the value of using the system increases for both users as organisations, cf.
Katz & Shapiro (1994).
32  The chain is as strong as the weakest link in federated IdM. 
33  One organisation can threaten the trustworthiness of all members of the federation. 
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5.4 Management of Digital Identities
Attributes of a user, which are operationally accessible by technical means (e.g. personal
information stored in data bases), form a   digital identity. Since each different set of attributes
can be regarded as a single digital identity, one user can have several – not necessarily entirely
distinct - digital identities. 
Creating, managing, manipulating and deleting these digital identities of a user are primary
functions of an identity management system. The manipulation of a digital identity includes
adding, deleting or changing some of its attributes, such as the postal address, the e-mail
address, or the hobbies of the respective user. These attributes can be filled in by the user or –
in  some  cases  –  automatically  configured  by  the  system.  For  digital  identities  unique
pseudonyms can be used as identifiers. Pseudonyms make it easier to handle and to reuse
digital identities. 
From a privacy perspective, it is important that personal data disclosed by the user acting
under  a  digital  identity,  cannot  be  linked  with  attributes  this  user  uses  with  other  digital
identities. Nevertheless if linkability is given, the identity management system should inform
the user and point out which data are linkable, to enable the user to avoid unintended linkage
between his digital identities.
5.5 Authentication Management
Federated identity management systems support authentication of users via identity providers
and  access  control  to  resources  of  service  providers.  In  contrast  to  identification,
authentication is the verification of a given identity. Verification is operated by showing a
certificate and attributes such as a key, a password or by having some privileges. As soon as a
user has authenticated herself, she gets access to the service. 
A special case of authentication is single sign-on, which enables a user to authenticate herself
just once and thereby gain access to the resources of multiple service providers. This feature
is usually provided by federated identity management systems.   
The  standard  functions  of  an  identity  management  system  concerning  authentication  and
access control are: 
• Support for access management (or enabling single sign-on for each session between
the client and the service provider) in order to get access to services of the service
provider. 
• Support  for  digital  signatures.  Digital  signatures  are  digital  data,  which  can  be
attached to an electronic file or message, and confirm its authenticity and integrity as
sent by the user's device, therefore guaranteeing the correctness of data in messages,
documents, e-mails or contracts.
• Support  for  authentication  credential  management  in  order  to  enable  the  user  to
manage her login data, e.g. login name, the corresponding password, and the URL of
the service provider. Of course the password needs to be kept secret for authentication
to work effectively. 
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A policy is a guideline concerning disclosure, use and manipulation of data, especially user-
specific personal data. These policies are necessary, both for users and for service providers.
A special case of a policy is a   privacy policy, whereby the service provider determines which
data he will store for which purposes and to what extent he will make use of these data during
the transaction and/or after the transaction has been finished. The possibility of looking at and
enforcing these policies is realised by policy management within an identity management
system. 
Besides this, the policy management gives the user   control of the use of his personal data,
because in each transaction case she can agree or disagree with the use of the data as the
service provider suggests it. Therefore, on one side the user determines which personal data
she transfers to which service provider for which purpose. On the other side, the service
provider also determines which data he needs from a user and how he will use them e.g., how
long he will store these data. Only if the policies of the user and of the service provider match
each other, data are transferred. 
At present policy management can take advantage of standard terms defined by the platform
P3P (W3C 2007); P3P makes an automatic recognition whether the user's and the service
provider's requirements match. 
Furthermore, the policy management should support translation between machine readable
policies and the wording presented to users.
5.7 History Management
History management of a federated identity management system logs all transactions with
identity/service providers and keeps a record of all personal data revealed. This information is
a basis for users’ awareness, comprehension, and exercise of their rights concerning privacy.
The history management should be able to present the data transferred and the context of its
transferral (time, purpose, recipient) to the user. Either the attribute disclosed is stored (e.g.
“first name”) or attribute and value disclosed are stored (e.g. “John”). In the latter case, the
history  management  contains  personal  data  which  may  require  further  privacy  protection
mechanisms. The history management is not intended to log all data the user discloses, for
example there is no logging of content of messages during her interaction with a chat partner
(although  the  messages  may  contain  personal  information,  if  they  are  interpreted
semantically).
5.8 Context Detection
To  help  the  user  to  handle  her  digital  identities  according  to  her  current  situation,  i.e.,
transaction  partner,  activity  and  history  of  personal  data  release  (c.f.   5.7),  the  identity
management system should be able to identify the context of the user automatically. The
context-detection  component  of  an  identity  management  system  should  identify  contexts
within the applications or the services the user interacts with. In case of a context switch, the
identity management can act in two ways: 
• either it makes some suggestions for further activities to ensure privacy and security of
the user (e.g. suggest to use another digital identity), or
• else  it  takes  action  autonomously  to  this  end  (e.g.,  based  on  previously  defined
preferences of the user). 
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5.9 Client-based vs. Server-based Storage of Personal Data
The storage of user specific personal data can be realised either on the user's own computer
("client-based storage") or centralised on a computer which acts as a server ("server-based
storage"). In the second case, the computer concerned is typically not under the control of the
user but operated by an identity provider. This means that the user needs additional interfaces
to access her personal data, and also that she has to trust the identity provider concerned not to
misuse  her  personal  data.  Trust  is  especially  required  with  regard  to  availability  of  the
personal  data.  In  theory,  confidentiality  and  integrity  can  be  realised  by  the  user  herself
applying cryptographic mechanisms. Server-based storage raises the question of transparency
of  the  transactions  using  personal  data.  With  respect  to  federated  identity  management
systems, distributed server-based storage of user’s digital identities across several identity
providers is also possible.
5.10 Security Aspects of Federation and related FIM Framework
Security  of  a  system  needs  to  be  understood  in  a  holistic  way.  Bruce  Schneier  (1996)
verbalised this as follows: “Security is a chain; it’s only as secure as the weakest link.” 
For Federated Identity Management Systems (FIMS) this means that each of many aspects
inside and outside of the federation framework and related communicational infrastructure
may define the effective level of security reached, as an adversary will most likely attack the
system in its weakest point. In this context we do not need to think about the security of FIMS
alone  –  as  FIMS  are  meant  to  be  used  as  an  authentication  infrastructure  for  many
applications  and  related  business  or  governmental  procedures,  the  security  level  of  these
procedures also depends on the security features (according to ISO/IEC 15408 (Common
Criteria) also called “security functions”) of the FIMS. 
In many cases FIMS are implemented as federation framework based on traditional directory
services or other (mostly organisation centric) identity management systems. They serve as a
source of reference for authentication information provided by a user during an authentication
procedure. As a consequence the security of FIMS depends at least on four layers:
1. An infrastructural layer composed organisational directory services including related
security infrastructure (layer 1),
2. The federation framework including related communicational infrastructure (layer 2),
3. The security of applications relying of the FIMS, as manipulation of the FIMS
principally via the application may be possible (layer 3), and
4. The user in case he is client of one of the organisations participating in the federation,
his local client and communication infrastructure (layer 4); (in case the user is member
of an organisation he belongs to layer 1)
Examples for this architectural concept are LibertyAlliance and OpenID. The following figure
shows architectural layers influencing the security of FIMS with a focus on user activities:
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The discussion of security aspects relating the user, his client and the various applications
(layers 3 and 4) are outside the scope of this deliverable. In this context we refer to existing
standards  covering  related  security  aspects  such  as  ISO  27002,  the  Baseline  Protection
Catalogues issued by the German Federal Office for Information Security
34 and the Common
Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408).
In the following section the focus will be put on security aspects of the infrastructural layer of
FIMS.
5.10.1 Security Aspects of the Infrastructure (Layer 1)
From  the  perspective  of  the  operator  of  procedures,  an  important  requirement  for  the
implementation of an appropriate security level is control, i.e., that the organisation is able 
• to establish a management system that checks and adjusts continuously and effectively
the activities and results of the following areas of activity 
• to define and describe the appropriate (and thus required) security level,
• to describe the related infrastructure; this typically includes: organisational units of the
organisation (including employees involved), environmental infrastructure (buildings,
rooms an the like), hardware, systems and components including corresponding
operating systems or firmware, networking infrastructure and applications involved,
• to carry out a risk assessment, and
• to set up and implement a risk treatment plan, namely required technical and
organisational security measures.
34  See http://www.bsi.de/english/gshb/index.htm
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consequence,  no  participating  organisation  alone  possesses  the  control  to  implement  the
required security level. In the FIMS context, each organisation is highly dependent on the
implemented security level of the other participating organisations in the federation. This
situation becomes even more complex if the participating organisations provide more than
one security level in their internal IMS. 
In any case according to international security standards such as ISO/IEC 27001 (Information
Security  Management  Systems  –  Requirements)  to  reach  a  reliable  security  level,  the
participants of a FIMS need
• security policies referring with respect to the FIM to the same (or a very similar)
security level;
• connected information security management systems including personnel resources
and security processes (e.g., for the maintenance of security concepts, security
incident handling and business continuity planning and management);
• a jointly agreed security concept containing 
o A description of the FIMS and related infrastructures
o A risk assessment
o A risk treatment plan (organisational and technical security measures)
• contractual agreements ensuring implementation, maintenance, auditing schemes and
enforcement of agreed technical and organisational security measures.
Typically, these essential security measures are beyond the horizon of the mostly product-
related  discussions  of  security  functions  of  federation  frameworks.  Nevertheless  they  are
relevant, as examples show in which security considerations also on this layer were a reason
not  to  introduce  FIMS,  though  potential  cost  savings  through  Single-Sign-On  (SSO)  and
distributed administration could have been significant.
35 
For an end-user (client of a participating organisation) these aspects are equally relevant, as
the  security  of  his  authentication  information  relies  on  the  security  of  the  infrastructure,
systems and applications of identity and service providers. The confidentiality, integrity and
availability of authentication data stored at the identity provider may be at risk. This leads to
an infrastructural security criterion: 
Security of the infrastructure supporting the federation framework and communication
infrastructure needs to be on an appropriate level. 
Traditionally, security and data protection policies of identity providers may be investigated
for information concerning this criterion, as these policies provide basic information for the
users.
5.10.2 Security  aspects  of  the  federation  framework  and
communicational infrastructure (Layer 2)
Federation  of  identity  is  performed  based  on  a  federation  framework  that  includes  an
infrastructure for establishing communication between participating organizations. The main
aim of identity federation is to enable users of one “security domain” to access services of
another domain. For that purpose, protocols are employed to broker information on identities,
35  See e.g. the U.S. American food service company Aramark, http://www.pcwelt.de/index.cfm?
pid=829&pk=60374
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including security token exchange between Requestors, Identity Providers (IP) and Security
Token Services (STS).
36 
Although  many  federation  standards  exist,  each  with  different  capabilities,  they  all  share
common security requirements. We list here Shibboleth (by Internet2), Security Assertion
Markup Language (SAML, by OASIS), Liberty ID-FF (by Liberty Alliance) and WS-* efforts
for web services (mainly WS-Security, WS-Trust and WS-Federation by IBM, Microsoft, and
partners).
37
There are many aspects in those standardized protocols that can directly or indirectly affect
the  security  of  the  federation  framework.  Basically,  the  message-level  authentication  and
authorization  in  the  federation  framework  depends  on  a  general  security  model.  For
evaluation purposes we propose three criteria: (a) the security model used, (b) the trust model
used and (c) security of communications.
5.10.2.1 Security Model
The security model of a federation framework relies on the notion of security tokens, which
represent a collection of claims that a user has with regard to authorization to certain services.
Security tokens constitute one of the core means for securing the process of authorization of a
certain user to a specific service. Typically, security tokens that are initially provided by one
STS (that corresponds to one IP in a domain) are used to access web services in another
domain, for example, by:
 Getting certified by STS corresponding to the second domain, or
 Obtaining new local security tokens that are valid for authorization to the web service
from STS in the second domain, or
 Getting validated by the Resource Provider’s STS.
The usage of security tokens depends on the established trust model. However, it is necessary
to exchange these tokens between participating parties by means of adequate communication
protocols, which entail the requirement of secure communication.
5.10.2.2 Trust Model
Federated trust can be based on different trust models. A trust model typically depends on the
different parties and entities contributing to the federation process, namely the STS, the IP, the
requestor, and the resource itself. The following figure illustrates the different entities/parties,
and the established trust between them.
36  Federated Identity – Wikipedia (2008) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federated_identity
37 Federated Identity Management and Web Services Security, IBM, 2005
http://www.redbooks.ibm.com/redbooks/pdfs/sg246394.pdf
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The requestor trusts the IP/STS of its own realm, and same does the resource with its IP/STS
in the second realm. The IP/STS in the different realms trust each other.
Based on this model, different trust topologies can be derived. Basically, they differ in the
way security tokens are issued, validated and exchanged by the different entities involved in
the process. For example, one approach (shown in figure   Error: Reference source not found)
requires the requestor to obtain a token from the IP/STS in its own realm, provide it to the
IP/STS in the second realm, which then check its validity and exchange it with a token that is
valid in this second realm. Using this token, the Requestor would be able to directly access
the  Resource.  Another  approach  would  require  the  requestor  to  obtain  a  token  from  its
IP/STS, supply it to the Resource which then validates the token at its own IP/STS before
granting access to the Requestor. 
5.10.2.3 Security of communication
The  requirement  of  secure  communication  between  participating  parties  is  important,
especially across different domains. The security of communication protocols is crucial to the
security and reliability of the overall FIMS since any malicious or involuntary breach of those
protocols could have several consequences such as the user obtaining access to a certain
service to which she is not authorized, or a user denied access to a service which she is
supposedly authorized to access. 
Therefore, message exchanged between services should be integrity protected by including
the  body  of  the  message  as  well  as  the  headers  in  the  signature.  Moreover,  encrypted
communication is needed (e.g. using transport security protocols).
39
Moreover, certain parameters used in the protocols need to undergo a strict verification due to
their sensitive nature. For example, in an HTTP protocol used by a Web Requestor, the   wreply
parameter including the URL to which responses are directed can be spoofed.  
38 Web Services Federation Language (WS-Federation) http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2006/12/federation/ws-
federation.pdf
39 Web Services Federation Language (WS-Federation) http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2006/12/federation/ws-
federation.pdf
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Security  tokens  must  either  have  an  embedded  signature  for  integrity  protection  or  be
included in message supporting integrity check mechanisms.
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The  attacks  that  can  be  carried  on  the  communication  protocols  are  mainly:  metadata
alteration,  message  alteration,  message  disclosure,  key  integrity,  security  tokens  replay
attacks, forged security tokens, etc…
5.11Conclusion
We now have a set of concepts and requirements that allow us to compare and assess the four
Federated  Identity  Management  frameworks/systems  selected  for  this  deliverable:  Liberty
Alliance, Shibboleth, PRIME and Microsoft Cardspace. 
40 Web Services Federation Language (WS-Federation) http://specs.xmlsoap.org/ws/2006/12/federation/ws-
federation.pdf
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On the basis of the concepts, requirements and metrics discussed in chapter 5, this chapter
provides an analysis of the four Federated Identity Management frameworks selected for this
deliverable: Liberty Alliance, Shibboleth, PRIME and Microsoft Cardspace. For each of the
systems, we will follow the structure adopted in chapter 5. We start with informational self
control (to promote and protect autonomy, and as an instrument to protect individual privacy).
Secondly,  we  address  end-user  adoption  requirements.  Next,  the  technical  aspects  are
discussed:  the  management  of  (partial)  identities,  authentication  management,  policy
management,  history  management,  context  detection  and  personal  data  storage.  Finally,
security on the different levels in the frameworks will be described. 
6.1 Liberty Alliance
The assessment of Liberty Alliance IdM is mostly based on an analysis of documentation,
which can be retrieved on the Liberty Alliance website.
41 
6.1.1 Control over identity through privacy
Liberty Alliance (hereafter ‘Liberty’) recognises that the implementation of its specifications
in connection with web-based offerings can lead to privacy and security concerns. Because of
this, Liberty provides tools and guidance for more secure, privacy-friendly services
42. 
Liberty  sees  privacy  as  a  “security  policy  applied  to  a  Principal”.
43 The  project  makes  it
possible for companies that use Liberty standards to comply with national privacy laws and
regulations.  However,  Liberty  does  not  manage  the  actual  compliance  with  these  laws.
44
Because of this, using Liberty specifications is no automatic guarantee for a certain level of
end-user privacy.
Liberty can be considered as a business centric approach to identity management, as it is
based on collaboration between organisations and on an implementation of its specifications
by these organisations. Moreover, the Liberty perspective on privacy is influenced by the fact
that the project itself does not provide products or services to the public, but merely the
specifications  for  standards-based  federated  IdM.  Because  of  this,  Liberty  states  that
companies  that  implement  Liberty  specifications  are  responsible  by  themselves  for
compliance with applicable privacy laws
45. The Liberty Alliance protocol is neutral regarding
data protection
46.
With regard to the Liberty Specifications, Liberty made the following decisions:
47 
 to use a decentralize architecture where centralized storage is not necessary;
41  See: http://www.projectliberty.org, last accessed on August 13, 2008
42  Liberty Alliance Project. (2003c). Privacy and security best practices (v2.0).
43  In this definition, Principal relates to the individual that discloses her personal information.
44  Liberty Alliance Project. (2003c). Privacy and security best practices (v2.0).
45  Liberty Alliance Project. (2003c). Privacy and security best practices (v2.0)., p.8
46  ICPP/ULD, & SNG. (2003). Identity management systems (ims): Identification and comparison study;
referring to: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. (2003). Working document on on-line authentication
services (wp 68). The fact that project was largely composed out of American participants, has raised the
attention of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party in 2003
47  Liberty Alliance Project. (2003c). Privacy and security best practices (v2.0).
File: 20090506_fidis_D3.12 final 1.0.odt page 39 to support and promote the sharing of consumer’s attributes based on permission of
the user; 
 to enable companies to use the best security, while information is transmitted acording
to the specifications;
 to  include  tools  that  enable  companies  to  respond  to  consumer  interests  regarding
privacy. 
Liberty pays substantial attention to privacy, but some of this attention is based on ‘non-
normative’  guidelines  and  specifications,  which  thus  are  not  mandatory  for  Liberty-
implementers. Moreover, the open character of the project makes it difficult to assess its
promoted IdM solution, as differences exist in the translation of Liberty Specifications. 
In  one  of  its  (non-normative)  documentations,  the  ‘Privacy  and  Security  best  Practices’,
Liberty recommends that implementing companies should comply with all relevant laws or
fair information practices. This statement is supported by an outline of several privacy laws
and fair information principles. In addition, Liberty recommends to give individuals: 1) clear
notice  considering  information  collection,  2)  choice  with  regard  to  what  personally
identifiable information is collected, 3) possibility to review, verify or update consent, 4)
reasonable  access  to  view  non-propretary  personally  identifiable  information,  and  5)  the
opportunity to provide corrections. Moreover, these recommendations stipulate the need for
purpose limitation, timeliness of data, complaint resolution, and security. 
As these recommendations should be   considered, it is up to the implementing organisations to
meet them. Customers cannot rely on the compliance with these recommendations. 
Ex ante and ex post information to the end-user.
In the ID-FF architecture overview of Liberty (non-normative), it is stated that the identity
federation should be predicated upon notice to the user and user consent, of which auditable
records should confirm that notice and consent were provided.
48 User notice upon federation
(and also defederation) is considered a functional requirement of Liberty identity federation.
49 
Because Liberty does not provide products or services itself, there is no standardized manner
for  e.g.  privacy  expressions  or  icons.  Moreover,  the  Liberty  Alliance  cannot  provide
information  about  the  concrete  applications  in  which  Liberty  specifications  are  being
implemented. Hence, much information provisioning about data processing is at the discretion
of Service Providers and Identity Providers. However, the Liberty Alliance website
50, does
provide an extensive overview of the project, its specifications, and architecture for example
by means of white papers.
Liberty Alliance Specifications do not provide a function for tracking the use of personal data.
Such a function has to be decided by the Identity Provider and Service Provider.
51 Moreover,
there exists no privacy seal function
52, for privacy-friendly implementations of Liberty. 
48 Liberty Alliance Project. (2003b). Liberty id-ff architecture overview (version 1.2), p.8
49 Liberty Alliance Project. (2003b). Liberty id-ff architecture overview (version 1.2), p. 16
50 On www.projectliberty.org, last accessed, August 14, 2008
51 Cf. ICPP/ULD, & SNG. (2003), p.139
52 As proposed by Alsaleh & Adams (2006)
File: 20090506_fidis_D3.12 final 1.0.odt page 40Choice and consent (and audience segregation)
Consent is key to Liberty’s vision: ‘permissions based attribute sharing’ is the foundation for
its functioning. Specifically, Liberty Alliance requires the consent of a user previous to the
federation of her identity. 
User  consent  can  be  automated  with  Liberty  Specifications,  for  example  with  a  tool  that
enables users to specify their authorization policies. Such policies would also make it possible
to confine the use of personal data throughout ‘circles of trust’. Next to this, with Liberty
Specifications,  customers  may  adjust  their  default  policy  with  so-called  permission
exceptions. Important in this regard is that user privacy preferences should match with SP’s
policies (Alsaleh & Adams 2006) .
Confinement of identities may be supported by means of Liberty Specifications’ support for
‘opaque handles’
53, which identifies an end-user by means of an arbitrary set of characters.
Opaque handles can make it more difficult to track the end-user when she navigates among
Service Providers
54, but should be refreshed periodically.
  55 In addition, Liberty Specifications
allow the use of an ‘Anonymous Identity Protocol’.  
With regard to the choice of an end-user to use and confine several identities, the creation of
different ‘circles of trust’ can contribute to the confinement of a user’s identity in one ‘circle’.
Thus, Liberty specifications support the use of multiple identities throughout contexts. In
addition, implementations must support the use of pseudonyms and anonymity.
56 
Alteration and deletion
The possibilities for alteration and deletion of personal data/identities is left at the discretion
of the implementers of a federation. Identities are stored decentrally at the identity provider,
so local conditions determine if alteration and deletion are possible   (ICPP/ULD, & SNG.
2003).  In  addition,  users  have  the  possibility  to  defederate  their  identities,  based  on  the
Federation Termination Notification Protocol, by selecting a ‘Defederation link’.
57
The Liberty solution for federated   IdM does not provide the   end-user with specific privacy
support, as privacy depends on the choices that are made in a specific implementation of
Liberty Specification. The various design options can influence the possibilities of privacy
breaches  (Alsaleh  & Adams  2006).  Organisations  that  implement  Liberty,  can  decide  by
themselves which kind of privacy-framework they will develop and how the guidelines and
recommendations  are  translated.  It  may  not  always  be  clear  if  organisations  provide
information by themselves considering the realisation of the (privacy-) recommendations and
specifications. 
6.1.2 User adoption characteristics
Trustworthiness (from the end-user's point of view)
Customers  can  decide  by  themselves  if  they  join  a  Liberty-enabled  ‘circle  of  trust’. The
trustworthiness of the federation will be one of the variables on which the user makes her
decision to proceed with federation. This trustworthiness is hard to achieve by the Liberty
53 Liberty Alliance Project. (2003b). Liberty id-ff architecture overview (version 1.2).p. 12 
54 Liberty Alliance Project. (2003c). Privacy and security best practices (v2.0), p. 19; even some other tracking
possibilities have been described by (Alsaleh & Adams 2006).
55 Liberty Alliance Project. (2003b). Liberty id-ff architecture overview (version 1.2).p.24
56 Alliance Project. (2003b). Liberty id-ff architecture overview (version 1.2), p. 16/17; (ICPP/ULD, & SNG.
2003), p. 138, 
57  Liberty Alliance Project. (2003b). Liberty id-ff architecture overview (version 1.2), p.27 
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implementers of the specifications (reputation, experience, etc.)
The mutual agreements between members of a federation can serve as a trust-establishing
mechanism, but it is not likely that customers can assess these agreements.
58 The Liberty
Interoperable  testing  program  may  provide  some  trustworthiness  for  a  Liberty
implementation, as this program binds the Liberty implementers to a defined quality level. 
Even though the user indicates by herself if she joins a circle of trust, much actions in a
Liberty federation are ‘behind the scenes’ and the circles of trust and its characteristics are
defined by the organisations that join the federation. In other words, trust levels for Liberty
implementations  can  be  different  as  the  technology  can  be  implemented  differently  and
because federations exist out of different organisations. 
Efforts, skill level, social settings, costs 
The Single Sign-In and Single Sign-off experience of Liberty implementation offers a feasible
user experience. The federation of identities is initiated by the service provider or identity
provider, which assures that the user does not have to put in much effort in the actual IdM. 
The design and interface of the Liberty implementations is a choice of the implementers, so
there is no guarantee for a consistent user experience. 
There is no need for individuals to download or install additional software to make use of
Liberty IdM, as implementation of the specifications is done at the service end. The Liberty
Alliance project counts many participants, which assures a high comparative adoption rate for
this particular IdM solution. Next to this, the open standards and specifications of Liberty can
assure  a  high  level  of  adoption.
59  Customers  can  make  use  of  Liberty  IdM  from  several
locations, and are therefore not bound to a single device. 
It is not sure to tell if customers will understand the idea of liberty-enabled federation and the
notion of ‘circles of trust’, even though the Liberty Alliance website may realise that these
concepts and definitions will settle down after a while. The choice to federate identities is left
to  the  user,  but  without  a  notion  of  federation  and  its  underlying  architecture,  it  will  be
difficult  for  individuals  to  make  a  deliberate  identity-decision.  Moreover,  there  may  be
difficulties for the user to keep track of the identity to which they are logged on inside a
certain federation, and the several requests for identity federation may be a overwhelming
experience. It is up to the implementers of Liberty to distribute the necessary help functions or
manuals to assist the user in the FIM experience. 
6.1.3 Management of Digital Identities
Digital identities are represented by different accounts that the user has at different identity
providers. If the user agrees to federate her digital identities between an identity provider and
service  providers,  the  same  account  can  be  used  for  interactions  with  various  service
providers, which belong to the same circle of trust as the identity provider. A   circle of trust is
a federation of service providers and identity providers that have business relationships based
on  Liberty  architecture  and  operational  agreements  and  with  whom  users  can  transact
business in a secure and apparently seamless environment.” (c.f., Figure   4) Still, the user can
have several accounts with one service provider and thereby she decides which account she
wants to use when signing on at a service provider. A single organisation can be both service
provider and identity provider. 
58  These agreements may be opaque or too extensive to scrutinize
59  Cf. http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/adoption, last visited August 14, 2008
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between federated providers for referring to a user. Thus, for instance, a service provider will
not be able to display a user’s identifier from the related identity provider (Liberty Alliance
Project, 2005). 
6.1.4 Authentication Management
Authentication  with  Liberty Alliance  is  based  on  the  SAML  standard  (OASIS  2008)  and
organised as follows (Liberty Alliance Project, 2005, pp.38):
1. The user wants to access a protected resource, e.g. she browses to the Web site of a service
provider without being authenticated so far.
2. She selects her preferred identity provider to sign in from a list that is presented by the Web
page of the service provider. 
3. There are three options how the login via identity provider can be realised: 
a) The user is redirected to the identity provider’s Web site and provides the usual login
information there. 
b) By clicking a link on the service provider’s Web page a   dialogue box from the
identity provider pops up and login information is required. 
c) The Web page from the service provider contains an   embedded login form from the
identity provider. In this case the user may provide his login credentials in plaintext to
the service provider, who controls the source code. This privacy/security risk should
be taken into consideration.
4. After successful login procedure, the service provider establishes a session based upon the
users’ identity federation with the identity provider.
When a user signs in at one provider, he will be authenticated at all members within the same
circle of trust and may use the other services without entering authentication information
again.
6.1.5 Policy Management
Liberty Alliance does not allow for policy negotiation and enforcement between users and
identity/service  providers.  (Liberty  Alliance  Project,  2005,  p.  8)  only  gives  an  overall
policy/security note:
“Identity federation must be predicated upon prior agreement between the identity and service
providers. It should be additionally predicated upon providing notice to the user, obtaining the
user’s consent, and recording both the notice and consent in an auditable fashion. Providing
an auditable record of notice and consent will enable both users and providers to confirm that
notice and consent were provided and to document that the consent is bound to a particular
interaction. Such documentation will increase consumer trust in online services. Implementors
and deployers of Liberty-enabled technology should ensure that notice and user consent are
auditably recorded in Liberty-enabled interactions with users, as appropriate.” 
Thus, policy management is shifted to local responsibility of identity providers and service
providers and is not part of the Liberty Alliance framework.
6.1.6 History Management
Liberty  Alliance  does  not  provide  any  history  functionality.  Such  features  may  be
implemented  by  identity  and  service  providers  directly.  However,  in  this  way  it  is  more
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6.1.7 Context Detection
Liberty Alliance supports no automatic choice of a digital identity according to preferences
stated by the user. 
For exchange of information about users between service providers and identity providers,
various  subclasses  of  information  and  their  formats  exist,  called   metadata  and  schema
(Liberty Alliance Project, 2005, pp. 22). This defines the context for technical exchange of
information about the user:
• Account/identity information is an opaque handle to identify the user within a special
context, i.e., the handle enables service provider and identity provider to refer to the
same user in the context of a transaction.  
• The   authentication context describes which technologies, protocols and processes are
used for authentication of users. Such metadata needs to be communicated between
service providers and identity providers to ensure interoperability and fulfilment of
additional requirements, e.g. legal obligations with respect to how users need to be
authenticated. 
• The   provider metadata are data concerning identity providers and service providers,
which  is  required  for  establishing  communication  between  each  other.  X.509
certificates or service endpoints are examples for provider metadata.
6.1.8 Client-based vs. Server-based Storage of Personal Data
According to the Liberty Alliance standard, user data are stored on different servers which
only contain parts of her data. Therefore different circles of trust exist. The user decides
which of her data can be processed by which circles (c.f. Figure 4).
Figure 4: Federated Network Identity and Circles of Trust 
(according to Liberty Alliance Project, 2005, p. 6)
6.1.9 Security measures implemented
The “Liberty ID-FF Architecture Overview” specifications document includes some general
security  guidance  that  need  to  be  considered  by  implementers  of  a  Liberty-based  FIM
architecture.  Those  guidance  notes  are  mentioned  in  the  form  of  “POLICY/SECURITY”
notes throughout the different parts of the document (Liberty ID-WSF) .
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defines  in  more  detail  a  set  of  mechanisms  for  authentication,  signing,  and  encryption
operations performed for communication between entities during identity federation for web
service access.
In most identity-based web services, the authorization of a service requestor to access the
resource is based on the authenticated identity of the requestor, the resource in question, and
an authorization policy (typically enforced at the accessed web service). The authorization
process involves several parties (IP, SP, Resource, etc…) to communicate authentication data
and metadata by means of “messages” transferred over “channels”. The table below (figure 5)
shows  the  security  mechanisms  and  the  correspondent  channel  or  message  security
requirement.
Security Mechanism Channel Security Message Security (for requests,
assertions)
confidentiality required optional
pre-message data integrity required required
transaction integrity – required
peer-entity authentication Identity provide – required
Service Provider – required
required
data origin authentication – –
non-repudiation – required
Figure 5:  Security Mechanisms and Channel/Message security requirements (Liberty Specs Tutorial)
Channel Security can be achieved only if the following rules are implemented:
 A Service Provider can authenticate the IdP using IdP server-side certificates.
 Mutual authorization: each Service Provider is configured with a list of authorized IdPs
and each IdP is configured with list of authorized SPs.
 Before a user presents personal authentication data to IdP, the authenticated identity of IdP
must be presented to the user.
Message Security is achieved by means of digital signatures only if the following applies:
 Digital signatures should use key pairs distinct from those used for TLS and SSL, also
suitable for long-term use.
 Request protected against replay and responses checked for correct correspondence with
issued requests
6.1.10 Security of protocols
According to the “Liberty ID-FF Protocols and Schema specification” document (Liberty ID-
FF Protocols and Schema Specification), the Liberty protocol suite consists of the following
protocols:
 Single Sign-On and Federation: The protocol by which identities are federated and by
which single sign-on occurs.
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handle (or name identifier) for a Principal.
 Federation  Termination  Notification:  The  protocol  by  which  a  provider  can  notify
another provider than a particular identity federation has been terminated (also known as
de-federation).
 Single Logout: The protocol by which providers notify each other of logout events.
 Name Identifier Mapping: The protocol by which service providers can obtain (often
encrypted) name identifiers corresponding to an identity federation in which they do not
participate.
However, this specification document does not define security requirements for those abstract
protocols, but rather defer them to Liberty-defined individual protocol profiles defined in
another  specifications  document  which  is  the  “Liberty  ID-FF  Bindings  and  Profiles
specification”. Nevertheless, confidentiality, privacy, and authentication mechanisms and a
message authorization model are defined as basic and generic security requirements to be
fulfilled by the protocols and their deployment environment (Liberty ID-WSF). 
Confidentiality and Privacy Mechanisms 
Confidentiality  and  privacy  mechanisms  are  basically  concerned  with  protection  of  the
information communicated between trusted parties and recipients of resource access requests.
The required measures to be employed to attain a certain level of confidentiality include
Transport  Layer  Channel  Protection  which  mandates  integrity  and  confidentiality  of
information communicated between peers based on SSL/TLS cipher suites. The document
recommends a set of TLS 1.0 cipher suites to be used, and anticipates that AES-based cipher
suites will be “widely adopted and deployed”. It is also recommended to use certificates and
private keys which are distinct from the SSL/TLS certificates/keys for signing and verifying
protocol  messages.   Message  Confidentiality  Protection  requirements  mandate  the  use  of
SOAP message security mechanisms to encrypt the child elements of the message body, and
the use of Encrypted Name Identifiers and Encrypted Attributes mechanisms which are also
necessary for Identifier Privacy Protection.
Authentication Mechanisms 
The  specifications  in   (Liberty  ID-WSF)  define  a  set  of  authentication  mechanisms  (with
specific identifiers) which are differentiated according to their ability to provide   Peer Entity
Authentication   and   Message Authentication. The peer entity authentication mechanisms are
concerned  with  either  unilateral  peer  entity  authentication,  or  mutual  peer  entity
authentication, both relying on the inherent security properties of the SSL/TLS protocol, and
requiring  usage  of  X.509  v3  certificates  for  authenticating  the  peers  by  demonstrating
procession  of  the  key  bound  to  the  corresponding  certificate. The  message  authentication
mechanisms rely on the integrity properties stemming from the digital signatures applied on
the message header and payload. Three mechanisms are defined in this specification which
are:  “X.509  v3  Certificate  Message Authentication”  based  on  the WSS  X.509  Certificate
Token  Profile,  the  “SAML Assertion  Message Authentication”  based  on  the WSS  SAML
Token Profile, and the “Bearer Token Authentication” which rely on bearer semantics (e.g.
SAML bearer tokens).
6.1.11 Other security aspects
Referring to the four layer model introduced in section 5.10 the Liberty framework in addition
to layer 2 also covers the layer 1. 
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60 covers security requirements related
to  identity.  Participants  in  the  Liberty  Framework  need  to  comply  to  a  set  of  predefined
security measures. The quality of the implementation of these security measures is described
in four assurance levels. For each assurance level the degree of implementation of the same
set of security measures is described. Section 3.7.1 (p. 58) of the “Liberty Identity Assurance
Framework” covers infrastructural aspects at the identity provider. This includes:
• Handling and organisational protection of secrets (e.g. passwords and PINs)
• Risk assessment and risk treatment regarding commonly known attacks in the area
of  technical   attacks  on  secrets  (e.g.passwords  and  PINs)  and   systems   (e.g.  by
introduction of malicious code and out-of-band-attacks)
• Physical and environmental security
• Access control procedures
• Secure storage of secrets (mainly encryption)
• Security relevant event and audit logging, analysis of log data 
• Implementation of changeable secrets
60  Version 1.1, 2008, see http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/4315/28869/file/liberty-
identity-assurance-framework-v1.1.pdf
File: 20090506_fidis_D3.12 final 1.0.odt page 476.2 Shibboleth
6.2.1 Control over identity through privacy
Shibboleth is a standards-based, open source software package for web single sign-on across
or within organizational boundaries.
61 It was designed for the purpose of providing users of
one organisations infrastructure access to online resources from both inside and outside the
organisation.  Shibboleth  ‘sits  on  top’  of  an  organisation’s  authentication  technology  and
provides a web single sign-on functionality for online resources. It supports the setting up of
agreements and interactions between an organisation (the Identity Provider (IdP)) and the
resource provider (Service Provider). These agreements can subsequently be used for all new
relations  with  whom  an  organisation  wishes  to  federate  (Internet2,  2008).   Predominantly,
Shibboleth aims at deployment in universities.
62  
Shibboleth is focused on those institutions that want to federate the identities of their users
(students, employees). Because of this, both the initiative for a federation and the approach to
privacy  depends  on  the  institution’s  approach  (Internet2,  2008).  However,  Shibboleth
emphasizes on user privacy and control over information in the access control arena (Erdos &
Cantor 2002). According to the Shibboleth information sheet, the Identity Provider only sends
minimal data to a Service Provider, and such data is only sent at the time a user accesses the
resource (of the Service Provider), so the service provider does not have to store data about
the users (Internet2, 2008). 
Shibboleth-based  federated  administration  allows  the  Service  Provider  to  rely  on  the
administration of user identities and attributes at a users’ origin site (the IdP) (Erdos & Cantor
2002). The origin site provides the attributes of a user to the Service Provider, on the request
of this Service Provider.
Ex ante and ex post information to the  end-user
Information about data storage and disclosure to resource providers in the federation will
mostly need to be distributed by the Identity Provider. Shibboleth does not provide a standard
interface or user tool which informs and supports the individual, so the use of identities and
underlying data need to be communicated by the IdP. Data disclosure will to an extent depend
on the local privacy policy of the organisation that construes and issues an identity. How this
privacy policy is presented to the individual is left up to the discretion of the IdP. 
Choice and consent (and audience segregation)
The amount of choice over identities that an individual has depends on the amount of identity
providers that join a federation in which a service provider is present. In theory it is not
unlikely that, even though Shibboleth is implemented, a user can only use one identity for the
services in a federation, because she joins only one organisation that is federated to a service. 
Choice between identities is also related to the contexts in which an identity can be used. As
an organisation (the IdP) initiates the identity federation, the amount of resources/service that
can be accessed with a certain identity shall be related to the agreements an IdP has made with
resource providers and the role and authorization of the user in the ‘original’ environment
(campus, employer, etc.).
61 ‘About Shibboleth’, http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/about.html, last accessed August 16, 2008
62 See also the educational scenario in paragraph 4.4.1
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the  user  to  define  an  ‘attribute  release  policy’,  which  should  be  the  responsibility  of  the
Attribute Authority at the Identity Provider (Erdos & Cantor 2002). However, Shibboleth does
not specify how such policies should be stored and managed. Thus, the use of such a policy
depends on the decisions made by the implementers of Shibboleth.
Finally,  Shibboleth  associates  a  “handle”  to  a  user  at  the  moment  she  wishes  to  enter  a
resource. The use of this handle avoids making it necessary to exchange the user’s name (or
any other identifying information) between the IdP and service provider. Shibboleth advises
not to use an existing user-id as a handle for IdP–SP communication, because this would
make it possible to retrieve user’s data from examining the handle alone (Erdos & Cantor
2002).
Alteration and deletion
User attributes in a Shibboleth federation are stored at the ‘home institution’ (the IdP) (Coyle
2007). Hence, alteration and deletion of identities and their underlying data is bound to the
policies and requirements from this institution.
6.2.2 User adoption characteristics
Trustworthiness (from the user's point of view)
Because identity federation with Shibboleth is initiated by an organisation with which a user
already has a relation with, trustworthiness of the system can be achieved by the reputation of
this  organisation,  their  information  provisioning  about  security  towards  the  user,  and  the
agreements they make with the Service Providers that join the federation. 
Shibboleth does not have a standard user interface for attribute exchange, and many actions
happen behind the scene, which makes it difficult for the user to derive trustworthiness from
the technical features of Shibboleth. 
Efforts, skill level, social settings, costs 
Users do not need to adopt the Shibboleth infrastructure by themselves. Adoption is a task for
the  institutions  that  wish  to  implement  the  system.  Moreover,  use  of  Shibboleths  is  not
complex, as much of the actions are opaque to the user. The complexity of the system happens
‘under the hood’. 
6.2.3 Management of Digital Identities
In Shibboleth the user is assigned to a so-called   home organisation, which acts as her identity
provider  and  administers  her  attributes.  Decision  whether  a  user  is  allowed  to  access  a
resource from a service provider is made by the service provider based on values of attributes
that are required by the service, e.g. age or affiliation with an organisation.
Various  digital  identities  may  be  created  by  allowing  different  service  providers  to  learn
different sets of attributes about a user. An   Attribute Release policy specifies which attributes
and values, known by the identity provider, can be released to service providers (c.f.   6.2.5).
Shibboleth allows users to create their own Attribute Release policies and thus to be in control
of their digital identities. Otherwise, the identity provider takes on this responsibility.
A user may have a unique persistent pseudonym as identifier at each service provider, thus
recognition of the user by the particular service provider is possible. However several service
providers are not able to exchange information about this user.
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The workflow for authentication with Shibboleth is visualised in   figure 6 and described below
(Eduserv 2008; Shibboleth 2005):
1. First, the user wants to accesses a protected resource, e.g. a Web site. 
2. The resource redirects the user to   Where Are You From   service of Shibboleth, so that
she can select her identity provider. Depending on the policy of the federation, the user
may be able to record this preference, perhaps in a cookie, for future use (c.f. 6.2.7).
3. The  user’s  browser  is  then  directed  to  her  identity  provider  and  includes  the
authentication request from the service provider. 
4. The user is authenticated with the help of the identity provider, by whatever means her
identity provider deems appropriate for this federation with the service provider (e.g.
username/password). 
5. After successful authentication, a one-time handle is generated for this session, and the
user is returned to the resource at the Web site of the service provider. 
6. The  resource  uses  the  handle  to  request  attribute  information  from  the  identity
provider for this user. 
7. The identity provider allows or denies the attribute information to be made available
to this service provider depending on the Attribute Release policy. 
8. Based on the attribute information made available, the resource then allows or denies
the user access to the resource. 
Figure 6:  Shibboleth authentication process (according to Eduserv, 2008)
Authentication requests and assertions are made using the SAML standard (OASIS, 2008).
For privacy and security reasons, assertions are signed with the key of the identity provider
and encrypted with the key of the service provider.
6.2.5 Policy Management
Shibboleth  offers   Attribute Release policies that determine which personal attributes can be
released to whom under which circumstances. The Attribute Release policies may be defined
either by the identity provider or by the user herself using the Shibboleth Attribute Release
Policy Editor (Federation.ShARPE, 2007), for instance. Currently, no management interfaces
are available that allow enforcement of the specified policies (Eduserv, 2008).
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and values are accepted from which identity providers. 
6.2.6 History Management
No information found. 
6.2.7 Context Detection
Contexts in Shibboleth are bound to service providers. That is, if a user is known to a service
provider, requesting the   Where Are You From service can be skipped and the authentication
process (c.f. 6.2.4) is abbreviated automatically.
6.2.8 Client-based vs. Server-based Storage of Personal Data
Since Shibboleth stores personal data on server-side, the user has to trust her identity provider.
The advantage of the server-based storage is the availability of the information without being
bound to a client device.
6.2.9 Security measures implemented
Shibboleth  has  a  relatively  complex  architecture.  The  current  version  of  the  Shibboleth
architecture  specification  is  written  in  the  OASIS  Security  Assertion  Markup  Language
(SAML, particularly SAML2) (SAML 2003). 
In fact, Shibboleth implements a selection of the possible SAML assertions (McLeish 2008).
Therefore, many of the security strengths of Shibboleth rely on the security considerations of
SAML (SAML 2005)   For example, in Shibboleth, an SP provides a service to authorization or
customization on the basis of a   security context
63 established by means of SAML browser
profile (Shibboleth, 2005b).
Shibboleth, as a FIM architecture, comprises a set of security services that enhance the basic
system. A simplified view of the Shibboleth architecture is based on a Service Provider (SP),
and Identity Provide (IdP), and a Federation Manager implementing a “Where Are You From”
(WAYF)  service  (Witheridge  2006).  At  each  resource  that  need  to  be  secured,  the
corresponding  SP  includes  Shibboleth  Attribute  Requester  (SHAR)  and  a  Shibboleth
Indexical  Reference  Establisher  (SHIRE).  Users  are  registered  at  IdPs  that  include  an
Attribute Authority (AA), a Handle Service (HS) and a local authentication system (by which
users sign on) (Rixon 2005). The WAYF service is chosen by the SP and can therefore be run
by it. 
63 Security context: the semantic union of the message's security header blocks (if any) along with other
security mechanisms that may be employed in the message's delivery to a recipient. E.g. security
mechanisms employed at lower network stack layers such as HTTP, TLS/SSL, IPSEC, etc (OASIS 2005b).
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As shown in Figure   7, the steps 1 to 8 between the SHIRE, the WAYF and the HS are used to
establish a   handle
64   for a certain user attempting to connect to a service. In steps 9 the SHAR
provides the handle to AA which returns (in step 10) a set of attributes based on which the
Access Control Manager at the SP can make an authorization decision for the user to access
the specific service (Rixon 2005; McLeish 2008).
The security features implemented in Shibboleth can be summarized as follows (Witheridge
2006):
• Message  Authentication:  based  on  PKI  certificates  for  mutual  authentication  of
messages exchanged between the IdP and SP.
• Transport Layer Security: based on the SSL/TLS protocols to protect communication
between different parties of the architecture.
• Message Layer Security: based on XMLSignature and XMLEncryption for protecting
SAML assertions based on which user authentication is communicated from an IdP by
means of a user handle.
• Federation Metadata (trust relationships) Protection: based on message and transport
layer security between IdP and SP.
• HTTP  state  management:  based  on  session  cookies,  providing  SSO  capability  and
protected against theft and session hijacking by means of IP address checking.
6.2.10 Security of protocols
Following are the main security aspects of the generic protocols taking place from the time a
user attempts to access a service through the service provided, until he is authorized to access
the service (Rixon 2005).
1. Determining the user’s home site
The site where the user is registered and can sign on using a local password is determined
when the SHIRE intercepts the attempt to access the web resource. This initiates the search
64  A temporary, anonymized and unique reference to the user that is understood by the other services at the
user's point of registration.
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implicitly requires the WAYF service to provide “some means for the user agent to cache the
user’s selection, perhaps using HTTP cookies…” in order to retain the user’s information for
future authentications (Rixon 2005).
2. Getting the handle
When a handle is derived by the HS, the latter encodes it in a   SAMLResponse
65,   and applies a
digital signature on it. This response is presented to the user within an HTML form as a
hidden parameter (base-64-encoded). The form tells the user the kind of security information
shared with the SHIRE. The latter validates the signature of the SAMLResponse, e.g. using a
“certificate passed along with the [SAMLResponse]”.
3. Getting the attributes
In steps 9 and 10 of the figure, where the SHIRE and AA exchange handle and attributes by
means of SAMLRequest and SAMLResponse, the two entities can use any protocol, but the
Shibboleth specification requires support of SOAP 1.1 and HTTPS (it is up to the virtual
organization to choose any or none of those two).
4. Precautions
Furthermore, the Shibboleth target deployment guide (Shibboleth 2004) recommends a set of
security precautions to be satisfied by the deployment environment for the protocols not be
compromised. The recommendations can be summarized as follows:
a) SSL,  though  optional  for  target  sites,  should  be  used  when  possible  (Federation
guidelines should be considered), especially with client machines in order to avoid
man-in-the-middle-attacks, and to protect sensitive data. 
b) Safeguarding the WAYF service is necessary to avoid attacks during redirection steps,
as well as ensuring that rogue targets and origins are not used.
c) Enterprise directory of users require proper security measures on directory acess and
population (avoid plaintext passwords).
d) Server  platforms  should  be  properly  secured,  cookies  on  client  machines  well
protected.
6.2.11 Other security aspects
Shibboleth is relying on the “InCommonFederation”
66 policies, requirements and information.
Participants in the Shibboleth federation need to sign a compliance agreement with documents
published there. In the section “technical information”
67 also aspects of security are covered,
but  this  is  mainly  related  to  the  handling  of  identifiers  and  the  set  up  and  operation  of
certificate authorities. Aspects of operation systems security, environmental security etc. are
not covered in these documents.
65 XML structure defined by the Security Assertion Mark-up Language
66 See http://www.incommonfederation.org/
67 See http://www.incommonfederation.org/technical.html
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The assessment of the PRIME-project solution to IdM is mostly based on an analysis of
documentation, which can be retrieved on the website of the PRIME-project.
68 
6.3.1 Control over identity through privacy
The PRIME IdM solution aims to develop an IdM system, which is user centric and privacy-
enhanced.  Because  of  this,  the  EU  funded  research  project  has  the  principles  of  data
minimisation and ‘maximum privacy’ as starting points. During its life span it has developed
IdM  solutions  based  on  state  of  the  art  technologies  in  the  field  of  privacy  enhanced
technology (PET). 
By  default,  the  PRIME  IdM  solution  makes  interactions  anonymous,  e.g.  by  concealing
network  addresses  of  the  user.  Moreover,  the  system  relies  on  the  use  of  various  partial
identities, cryptography, user policy negotiation, user data tracking, and user assessment of
platforms and services. The system uses credentials and, where necessary, makes use of PKI
and trusted third parties (Fischer-Hübner & Hedbom 2008).
The  PRIME  functions  with  a  user-controlled  module  (that  can  take  over  IdM  tasks  from
applications like web browsers) and a module located at the service. PRIME uses a holistic
approach  to  privacy-enhanced  IdM,  which  takes  economic,  legal,  HCI,  and  social
considerations into account. For its legal considerations, PRIME takes the EU Data Protection
Directive (95/46/EC) as a starting point. 
Ex ante and ex post information to the end-user.
The PRIME console, which is the module located at the end-user’s end, aims to inform the
user by means of a standard user interface, which handles all privacy-related functionality
(Casassa-Mont et al., 2007, p. 25). The interface can take over web-based interfaces so the
user has a consistent experience when it concerns IdM. 
Prior to data collection, information is provided to the user by the PRIME console with a
function that asks if data may be sent to the service provider. This ‘Ask Send Data module’,
functions as a click-through agreement (Pettersson 2008, p. 24). The module indicates the
data  to  be  sent,  which  organisation  is  the  receiver,  and  the  terms  and  conditions  of  data
sharing (Pettersson 2008, p. 24). Another feature of the console is that it can indicate the
integrity of the data receiver, by means of an assurance evaluation. 
In  PRIME,  users  can  define  predefined  privacy  preferences  for  certain  services.  These
predefined settings are indicated with icons (e.g. a mask for anonymous, and a face for the
situation when data is stored) (Pettersson 2008, p. 28). The different icons inform the user of
the kind of identity that is being used in a specific situation. 
With regard to information provisioning after data has been collected, it is relevant to mention
that the PRIME solution provides a ‘data track’ function, so the consumer can recall when
data is requested and used and which agreements have been entered. 
In general, it needs to be mentioned that the PRIME project provides additional information
about the operating procedure of PRIME technologies by means of tutorials and extensive
documentation. This information gives insight in the working of PRIME applications. 
68 See:  http://www.prime-project.eu, last visited August 13, 2008
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Anonymous  communication  is  one  of  the  starting  points  of  PRIME.  Because  of  this,  the
system  allows  users  to  choose  in  which  way  they  want  to  present  themselves  to  others,
varying from anonymous communication to the use of different partial identities (including
pseudonyms). Of course, the kind of identity used and the attributes that are part of this
identity, need to be in conformity with the requirements of the service provider. However,
assuming that a service provider also uses PRIME technologies, multiple identity-choices are
supported.  Moreover,  the  use  of  (certified)  credentials  makes  it  possible  to  create
(trustworthy) identities without a need for superfluous data exchange. 
The PRIME console assists in making a choice for a specific identity and negotiates between
policies. When the requirements of the user   are in harmony with the demands of a service
provider, data exchange can take place automatically. If this is not the case, the user will be
asked to choose a suitable identity and will need o consent to data use by means of the ASD-
module. 
Several preference settings can support the user in choosing the right policies and identities
for the interactions she engages in. With the use of such preferences, the PRIME console can
automatically confine the use of identities in certain contexts. 
Alteration and deletion
PRIME software installed at the user end and service end makes data management at the
service  side  possible.  The  PRIME  Architecture  gives  the  examples  of  ‘access  control
mechanisms’  that  can  enforce  the  privacy  policy  subject  and  ‘privacy  obligation
management’, which allowas automatic enforcement of privacy policy aspects (a.g. automatic
deletion of data after an agreed period of time) (Casassa-Mont et al., 2007, p. 25). According
to the PRIME architecture, the user manages all privacy-related data in a centralized store,
which makes it possible to keep track of data disclosure and data access by others (Casassa-
Mont et al., 2007, p. 25). 
6.3.2 User adoption characteristics
Trustworthiness (from the user's point of view)
PRIME  aims  to  create  trust  by  means  of  several  functionalities  in  its  system,  like  the
possibility to assess the user’s platform and the platforms that receive data on their security
aspects, e.g. by means of an assurance evaluation function in the PRIME console   (Andersson
et al 2005, p. 30), and possibility to track the data handling by service providers. 
On a higher level, the starting points of the PRIME project contribute to trust establishment,
because with anonymous communication and user control as starting points, vulnerability of
the  end-user  will  be  decreased  which  increases  the  trustworthiness  of  the  system  and  its
participating  parties.  In  this  regard,  the  possibility  to  prove  identity-related  claims  with
(anonymous) credentials and cryptography are worth mentioning, as these techniques make it
difficult for others to link data or to tamper with identities. 
Trust factors that are important for customers that use IdM systems, but which have no direct
relation with the technical security of a system like reputation, previous experiences, security
seals, and external audits, are present in the PRIME technology by means of the consistent
use of the PRIME console. Because this is the interface that handles all data transactions, it
functions as a trust-establishing mechanism. 
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PRIME has not developed commercial applications for IdM. The PRIME project, which is a
research  project,  has  however  developed  several  prototypes  for  example  in  the  field  of
location based services (LBS), or collaborative eLearning (CeL). The PRIME IdM solution
has not been implemented in existing operating systems or web browsers yet, which makes a
fast adoption of the technology unlikely at the moment. Moreover, the adoption of PRIME is
likely to be affected by the fact that for PRIME adoption, both on the user-side as the service-
side, a PRIME module has got to be implemented, which makes it hard to reach critical mass
(Casassa-Mont et al., 2007).
PRIME has functionalities that make it possible to automatically or semi-automatically handle
the  exchange  of  personal  information
  (Pettersson  2008).  Moreover,  the  use  of  predefined
preferences and identities can improve usability and can speed up the process of IdM (consent
and policy negotiation) for an end-user. However, the emphasis on user control and data
minimisation can also have a reverse side. First of all, customers may have difficulties to
understand the PRIME concepts of, for example, anonymous communication, unlinkability,
and  credentials-based  authentication.  Moreover,  it  may  be  difficult  for  the  end-user  to
comprehend when and why different identities actually need to be used. The need for privacy
on the internet may become more and more clear to many people, but it is unclear if an
average internet user can understand why PRIME is actually the solution to this problem.
Fortunately, instruments like the PRIME-tutorial do give some insight in the functioning of
PRIME. Moreover, it is an advantage that these tutorials are elaborated in several languages. 
For a seamless PRIME-enabled   IdM experience, it is necessary that users define preferences
and contexts, so the system can act semi-autonomous. However, without these efforts, use of
PRIME may be burdensome and even a frightful experience, because warnings and requests
for data can succeed each   other quite rapidly. Hence, PRIME adoption requires some effort of
the   end-user. Only when an   end-user is willing to invest in using the system, adoption will be
achievable.    
6.3.3 Management of Digital Identities
The   PRIME Identity Manager (see figure   8) allows the user to administer her personal data
within  PRIME  and  to  configure  various  settings  concerning  his  digital  identities.  These
setting’s are called   Preference Sets (short form:   Presets) for version 2, respectively   Privacy
Preferences (short form: PrivPrefs) for version 3. 
The  usual  process  of  user’s  management  and  usage  of  her  digital  identities  is  handled
dynamically by the so-called „Send Personal Data?" – Dialogue. This module intercepts the
data flow of a common application and directs it to the PRIME system. PRIME then requests
user’s input for the handling of the disclosure of her personal data and redirects data to the
application accordingly. Thereby the user has the option to choose data for transfer to the
transaction partner, e.g. pseudonyms, credentials etc. The user also provides her informed
consent via the „Send Personal Data?” – Dialogue. 
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6.3.4 Authentication Management
Assuming that both, the user’s device and the service provider have installed the PRIME
middleware, authentication of the user takes place as follows (Casassa-Mont et al., 2007, pp.
64):
1. The user browses to the Web site of a service provider and wants to get access to a
protected resource.
2. In  this  case,  when  personal  information  from  a  user  is  required,  the  PRIME
middleware of the service provider sends a request for an identifier of the user (e.g.
pseudonym) to the PRIME middleware on the user’s device. 
3. On the user’s device a pseudonym is generated and sent back to the service provider,
who checks whether data about this pseudonym is already available in the data base
and if authentication based on these data is possible.
4. If this check fails, further information is requested from the user. For each piece of
requested data the service provider submits data handling policies that describe the
purpose of the data collection (e.g. payment) and related obligations (e.g. deletion of
data after defined period of time).
5. The user device checks whether the provided data handling policies from the service
provider  match  the  user’s  preferences  and,  after  positive  matching,  the  requested
personal data is sent to the PRIME middleware of the service provider and passed on
to the application. 
6. Now the user can be authenticated and access to the restricted resource is granted. The
PRIME middleware is responsible for enforcing data handling policies, e.g. deleting
the data item after a fixed period of time.
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In PRIME users state their preferences concerning the handling of their personal data by
defining Presets (and choosing PrivPrefs in version 3, respectively). Service providers submit
templates  for   data handling policies bound to each requested personal data items. Before a
user  discloses  personal  data,  both  the  user  and  the  service  provider  agree  on  those  data
handling policies. 
The negotiation process starts with the data handling preferences of the user and the template
for the data handling policy presented by the service provider. Preferences set by a user are
enforced by comparing each request for personal data by a service provider against the user’s
statement. Only if the negotiation process succeeds, i.e., there are no conflicts during the
comparison or there is an explicit consent of the user, requested personal data is revealed
under the agreed policy. The service provider guarantees for enforcement of the data handling
policy (Casassa-Mont et al. 2007; PRIME, 2008a).  
6.3.6 History Management
The Data Track is the PRIME history feature allowing the user to review all her transactions
at different points in time, including any personal data revealed to service providers. Thus, it
is possible to reconstruct how much personal data a service provider has accumulated and to
estimate if he may be able to draw any unwanted conclusions from that information. The Data
Track  records  are  automatically  logged  during  user’s  interaction  with  the  “Send  Personal
Data?”  –  Dialogue  and  enables  her  not  only  to  understand  which  personal  data  were
disclosed, but also to whom, when, and for what purpose. 
The graphical interface of the Data Track presented to the user offers different views to her
data, as well as search functionality and a help dialogue. 
6.3.7 Context Detection
By configuring settings for digital identities, the user explicitly states how personal data shall
be  handled  in  different  contexts,  i.e.  concerning  different  service  providers  or  different
activities of the user. So-called   bookmarks can be used by the user in order to define which
pre-configuration  of  privacy  preferences  should  be  applied  to  which  service  provider
(Bergmann, 2007). Thus, context detection in PRIME version 2 is bound to service providers.
Version 3 expands the definition of context to activities, since users can choose between
PrivPrefs that focus on the purpose of a transaction, e.g. “anonymous surfer” or “returning
customer” (Bergmann et al., 2008).
6.3.8 Client-based vs. Server-based Storage of Personal Data
In PRIME, personal data of users including credentials issued by distinct authorities are stored
on client-side. Thus, the user is in control of her data, but always needs access to her client
device which is running the PRIME middleware in order to use the identity management
service.
6.3.9 Security measures 
PRIME  security  architecture  can  be  viewed  from  three  different  perspectives.  First,  the
personal data stored within the secure data storage of each PRIME core
69 is secured with the
PRIME policy engine. The second perspective is of the trusted certificates imported into the
69 Communication entities running the PRIME software are called PRIME core, e.g. the web services on
server side, but also a local PRIME core installed at the clients machine.
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perspective are Basic Authentication passwords to further protect specific web services with
privileged access.
6.3.9.1 Policy Evaluation for the Secure Data Storage
Every  PRIME  core  includes  a  protected  data  storage  for  holding  personal  information.
Information  can  be  stored  into  the  storage  without  policy  evaluation,  but  retrieval  of
information (disclosure) is
• evaluated by the PRIME policy engine,
• logged in the PRIME Data Track and
• delivered with all data handling policies attached.
The policy language can request the presentation of credentials or other information (e.g.,
passwords). Credentials are either anonymous Idemix credentials or signatures created with
OpenPGP. In the data disclosure process when browsing with a PRIME enabled web browser,
the personal data as credentials or passwords are transferred directly between PRIME cores
and never gets disclosed to either the client web browser nor the server's web application.
6.3.9.2 Trusted Certificates between PRIME cores
For  all  communications  between  PRIME  cores  and  all  web  service  access  is  done  using
TLS/SSL and https with server certificates. The connection is only established, when the
server certificate is known and trusted to the requesting key store. In case of unknown server
certificates to a PRIME client core, a pop-up message informs the user and allows to override
the security warning.
Public Key Infrastructures are honoured by the key store and the developer version of PRIME
comes with a pre-installed certificate issued by the Technische Universität Dresden as well as
scripts and documentation how to create an own Public Key Infrastructure.
6.3.9.3 Privileged Web Services and Basic Authentication
Some Web Services within PRIME have privileged access to the data storage or provide
configuration functionality. Most of these Web Services are only required during development
or  during  the  server  set-up. They  are  not  started  by  default  and  have  to  be  activated  by
specifying an access password.
When accessing the Web Services, Basic Authentication Scheme over https is used to restrict
the access. A password can either be set for the whole Web Service or for individual functions
in one Web Service API. Should Basic Authentication not be sufficient, it is possible to extend
PRIME  and  perform  more  sophisticated  access  control,  e.g.  by  using  the  PRIME  policy
engine.
Further details about the security measures for PRIME can be found in (Casassa-Mont et al.,
2007 and Camenisch et al 2009).
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The assessment of Windows CardSpace is based on an analysis of documentation, scientific
papers, and the user interface of the system
70. 
6.4.1 Control over identity through privacy
Windows CardSpace (‘CardSpace’) is a system that does not mandate a single approach to
digital identity, but aims at being an ‘identity metasystem’. The system is agnostic about the
format of the security token that is used, so CardSpace can work with multiple digital identity
systems (Chappell 2006). Moreover, CardSpace is open standards based (Malinen 2006). It
can not be considered as a Single sign-on system. 
CardSpace  is  designed  to  meet  the  ‘laws  of  identity’,  which  have  been  elaborated  by
Microsoft's Kim Cameron. These laws of identity amongst others comprise the requirement
for user control and consent, minimal disclosure of information, interaction with justifiable
parties,  and  preventing  unnecessary  correlation  handles  (Cameron  2005).  Hence,  several
privacy considerations have been taken into account in the design of the system. Moreover,
one of the design rationales behind the identity metasystem architecture is that consumers will
need to be convinced that the solution improves the consumer privacy landscape (Cameron &
Jones 2006).
CardSpace  aims  at  identity  management  at  the  end  user’s  machine  (Malinen  2006),  by
providing software that is integrated in its Vista operating system, can be integrated with
Internet Explorer and other browsers, and can be used on other operating systems. Some of
the features of the CardSpace solution are that it can circumvent the use of passwords and
usernames at the   service provider, that it can ‘take over the system’ of the end-user, and that it
provides comprehensible metaphors for digital identities, called ‘InfoCards’. 
Ex ante and ex post information to the end-user.
The interface of CardSpace aims to provide a consistent user experience for the handling of
digital identities. Its ‘Identity Selector’, one of the core components of the system, enables the
user  to  make  decisions  about  her  digital  identities,  on  the  basis  ‘information  cards’. The
underlying data of an information card can be scrutinized as well. 
The interface gives insight in the information that will be sent to a service provider. Moreover,
it has the feature of providing the user an overview of the site information and the certificate
that has been issued to the service provider (if any).
71 If the service provider has defined a
privacy  statement,  this  will  can  be  accessed  in  the  CardSpace  interface.  However,  the
information provided to the end-user is to an extent left up to the service provider and the link
to this information does not stand out dominantly in the interface. 
When an identity needs to be chosen by the end-user, the interface indicates which InfoCards
have been used previously in the interaction with the service provider. Moreover, the user can
assess when certain InfoCards were shown to a service provider. After an InfoCard has been
selected, however, the user may forget under which identity she has logged on for a service. 
70 General information about CardSpace can be found on:
netfx3.com/content/WindowsCardSpaceHome.aspx , last accessed on August 15, 2008. 
71 This has been regarded as a privacy-flaw in the system, as several levels of  security/trustworthiness come
together in the same user interface, cf. Alrodhan & Mitchell (2007).
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However,  CardSpace  has  as  a  starting  point  that  from  the  chosen  InfoCard  only  the
information is forwarded which has been requested by the service provider. 
Next to the fact that a end-user can create her own InfoCards, these can be issued to the end-
user by identity providers. Such InfoCards are stored at the user machine, but do not comprise
‘non-sensitive meta-information’ (Alrodhan & Mitchell, 2007). These issued InfoCards can
indicate  information  about  the  identity  provider,  like  contact  information  and  token
information (Cameron & Jones 2006).
Choice and consent (and audience segregation)
The CardSpace system can be regarded as a user-controlled system, as identity cards are
stored at the user’s device and because she decides if an identity is being used and which
identity this will be. If possible, the consumer can issue her self constructed identity cards.
However, when a service provider requires an identity that is assigned by an Identity Provider,
the amount of identity-choices will depend on the requirements of the service provider, and
the amount of IdPs that can meet these requirements. 
Because CardSpace is a meta-system, any type of token/digital identity can be used. This
means that the end-user can use identities that are based on different standards. This also
means  that  different  levels  of  security  or  privacy  may  co-exist  inside  the  CardSpace
metasystem. 
CardSpace separates the IdP from the service provider and puts the user in the middle of
identity management. So, next to the fact that this system makes it possible to keep identities
apart, the IdP and service provider can also be kept apart. However, this does not necessarily
have to be the case, as the system supports ‘auditing identity providers’ as well (Cameron &
Jones 2006), which can track the use of a certain identity. 
The  separation  of  identities  throughout  context  can  be  assured  by  the  support  for
‘unidirectional  identifiers’  (Cameron  &  Jones  2006),
  so  that  identifiers  that  are  given  to
service providers cannot be linked to the identifiers given to others. 
The CardSpace system is based on proving claims. Identities that are provided to service
parties, only exist out of the data that is requested by the service provider, which would make
linking of personal data on the basis of superfluous information not possible. 
Alteration and deletion
In theory, service providers/relying parties do not need to store data. CardSpace facilitates
“data  rejection”,  because  the  Identity  selector  in  the  user  interface  can  remember  which
identity has been used for a site (Cameron & Jones 2006). This information can be re-supplied
on request. Sites thus may discard their information about an end-user.
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Digital  identities  created  by  an  end-user  herself  can  be  altered  and  deleted  easily  in  the
interface. But there seems no automated possibility to delete any information at the service
provider\relying party, when any information is stored at this point. Identities can be removed
from  the  Identity  selector,  but  this  will  only  remove  metadata.  It  will  depend  on  the
characteristics and agreements of the Identity Provider if the actual digital identities will also
be removed at the IdP.   The terms and conditions under which an IdP issues and creates
identities may also influence the end-user’s possibilities to alter such identities. In addition,
there are difficulties when identities are lost or stolen. In such a case, users need to contact
identity providers and relying parties (cf. Chappell 2006). 
72 But it seems that it is up to the service provider to make this decision. 
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The laws of identity, which were already mentioned in the previous paragraph, also elaborate
on  the  need  to  have  human  integration,  pluralism,  and  a  consistent  user  experience
implemented in an Identity Management System (Cameron 2005). Hence, they ought to have
provided a foundation for the usability and adoption features of CardSpace. 
Trustworthiness (from the user's point of view)
Trustworthiness  can  be  realized  by  means  of  the  standard  user  interface  and  consistent
representation of digital identities for all IdM decisions. This also counts for the fact that users
control the identities used in a service, that they can assess the underlying data of an identity,
and that the previous use of digital identities can be checked. 
One  goal  of  CardSpace  is  to  have  reliable  site-to-user  authentication  (Cameron  &  Jones
2006). Thus, websites should authenticate themselves to the user. To enable this, CardSpace
utilizes the use of high value certificates.
73 It depends on the service parties however, to obtain
such  a  certificate.  Parties  are  not  obliged  to  use  certificates,  so  customers  may  also  be
confronted with service providers that do not authenticate themselves correctly. Hence, with
CardSpace it is not completely   impossible that users interact with malicious parties. This
depends on the decisions made by the user (Alrodhan & Mitchell, 2007). On the other hand,
with CardSpace, malicious parties would not be able to obtain username and password, as this
kind of information is not shared between the ‘identity selector’ and the service provider. 
Service providers and identity providers do not need to establish a preceding ‘trust relation’,
to be able to collaborate through CardSpace. However, it is worth mentioning that IdPs may
become aware of the identities of the service providers to which the user attempts to log in
(Alrodhan & Mitchell, 2007). When this is the case, IdPs may track the customers, which can
be detrimental to the trustworthiness of an IdP (as, the end-user becomes more vulnerable to
this IdP). 
Increased trustworthiness of CardSpace itself can moreover be derived from the fact that most
users have experience with Microsoft products. Moreover, the fact that it has developed a
local agent for identity management (in stead of a Microsoft-in-the-middle approach), may
enhance the overall trustworthiness of CardSpace (but not the organisations that make use of
it). 
Efforts, skill level, social settings, costs 
The comprehensive user interface of CardSpace makes it relatively easy to operate by aN end-
user. The metaphor for digital identities (the InfoCard) is understandable to many individuals,
and  most  people  will  be  able  to  understand  their  function,  without  the  necessity  of
understanding its technical complexity. It is not sure however, if users comprehend that the
identity cards do not, by themselves, comprise identity information, but metadata in stead.  
Because CardSpace is implemented in the Vista operating system and can be used for multiple
other OS’, it is likely that the adoption of this IdM system is potentially high. CardSpace has a
large potential user base, especially because interoperability with other standards and IdM
solutions (e.g. OpenIdentity) is one of its starting points.
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The  CardSpace  interface  has  several  help  functions  and  click-through  options,  which
increases the usability for non-skilled users. It is not sure, however, if and how individuals are
going to shop for identities at identity providers, and it may still be difficult for them to
73 In collaboration with VeriSign, see: Cameron & Jones (2006).
74 Cf. http://www.identityblog.com/?p=668, last accessed on August 15, 2008
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even though individuals are relieved from the burden of using passwords and usernames for
service providers, it is not clear what kind of authentication procedure is necessary at the IdP.
Moreover, it is not clear in which languages the help functions are available to the customers. 
Finally, users may also have difficulties with the use of their digital identities on different
computers.  Even  though  it  is  possible  to  export  and  transfer  the  InfoCards  (cf.  Chappell
2006), users may experience difficulties to do so (especially when self-assigned identities
need to be transported, or are created on, for example, public computers). In addition, the
need to lock and secure local computers becomes increasingly important, when CardSpace is
installed on a device. 
6.4.3 Management of Digital Identities
CardSpace distinguishes between two basic types of information cards that represent digital
identities of users.   Personal cards can hold varying personal data, e.g., name, e-mail address,
date of birth, or similar. This information is encrypted locally and may be sent to partner
websites  if  necessary.  However,  the  user  decides  which  data  should  be  revealed  to  the
respective service provider. Personal cards are also called self-issued cards since the user has
also the role of an identity provider in this case. The second type of cards is called   managed
cards.  These  represent  information  (e.g.  credit  card  information)  provided  by  other
organisations which act as identity providers and maintain the actual data in their systems,
while  the  user's  local  managed  card  contains  a  link  to  these  data  (Microsoft  Corporation
2008b). 
CardSpace allows the user to define any number of personal cards or acquire managed cards.
Each card in consists of 
• a unique ID,
• time and date of creation,
• a claim about a set of personal data (security token), e.g., name and e-mail address,
that form a digital identity of the user,
• digital signature of the identity provider. 
The user chooses from her set of cards (digital identities) which data should be revealed to the
respective service provider. Thus, service providers can have varying knowledge of the user’s
identity.
6.4.4 Authentication Management
The process of authentication with CardSpace proceeds as follows (Microsoft Corporation
2008a): 
1. The user tries to access a protected resource of a service provider.
2. The service provider communicates to the user’s client, which security token would be
required. 
3. CardSpace filters users’ cards and finds those that would fulfil the service provider’s
requirements. The user selects one of those cards, e.g. a managed card. The selected
card does not contain personal data, but specifies which identity provider posseses the
required information.
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provider, who generates a respective security token and sends it back to the user’s
client. 
5. After the user gives his consent, the security token is released to the service provider.
6. Based on the personal information included in the security token, the service provider
grants the user access to the resource.
In CardSpace, the user has the option to set passwords for particular cards. Thus, even if
others have access to her client device, access to her personal data can be protected.
6.4.5 Policy Management
The user decides how many and which of her cards may be transmitted to service providers.
Besides necessary data which is requested by the service provider, optional information can
be  included.  Based  on  a   privacy  policy  that  service  providers  should  publish,  users  may
decide to interact with that service provider and to release personal information via cards.
There are no rules for format or content of such a privacy policy (Microsoft Corporation,
2007). 
In  order  to  specify  requirements  from  the  service  provider  concerning  acceptable
authentication mechanisms (e.g. trusted identity providers, type of security tokens…), user’s
device  retrieves  a  service  provider’s   security policy. CardSpace matches the requirements
from the service provider with the user’s cards in order to find those cards, which meet the
security policy (Alrodhan, Mitchell, 2007). 
6.4.6 History Management
In order to keep a record of all personal data that a user has released to service providers,
CardSpace  stores  a  history  of  usage  for  each  card.  This  history  contains  the  following
information (Microsoft Corporation, 2008c):
• Information about the service provider, who has received a card.
• Time and date when the card was sent.
• Type of data that was sent, but not data itself, e.g. item “date of birth” is stored in the
history, but not value “1976-04-01”.
History  information  of  a  card  is  not  transmitted,  when  the  card  is  revealed  to  a  service
provider. 
6.4.7 Context Detection
Context detection in CardSpace is bound to service providers as transaction partners. Due to
the  history  that  is  stored  for  each  card,  users  can  be  informed  if  a  new  service  provider
requests a card (c.f. Figure   9) or if the required identity information of a service provider who
already obtained a card has changed and additional data is requested
75 (Microsoft Corporation,
2008c). When  the  user  is  asked  for  personal  information  from  a  service  provider,  whose
domain has been visited before, CardSpace automatically suggests the most-used card for that
service provider. 
75 If additional data is requested, the user may add this information to the respective card, use another one or
create a new card for this service provider.
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6.4.8 Client-based vs. Server-based Storage of Personal Data
Contrary  to  its  predecessor  Microsoft  .NET  Passport,  CardSpace  does  not  store  personal
information on a central server. Some data are being encrypted and held client-side, while
other data remains on the servers of identity providers. This arrangement defines the de-
centralised nature of the CardSpace system.
6.4.9 Security measures implemented
Windows  Cardspace  security  model  relies  on  the  idea  of  Infocards  that  describe  a  trust
relationship between a user and a security token service (STS). Windows Cardspace employs
SAML  tokens  and  is  based  on  WS-Trust,  WS-Security,  and  WS-Policy  and  WS-
SecurityPolicy standards for handling these tokens. Its security is strongly tied to the WS-*
efforts led by IBM, Microsoft and Verisign. 
WS-Security  allows  communicating  using  SOAP  messages  the  security  token,  which  is
obtained through the STS of the corresponding IdP based on the WS-Trust standard. WS-
SecurityPolicy permits the service provider of web service to express a security policy. WS-
MetadataExchange defines a way to exchange service description over the internet.
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Windows CardSpace does not depend on the format of the security token obtained from the
IdP.  Therefore,  CardSpace  works  with  legacy  digital  identity  systems,  using  any  type  of
security token, whether simple usernames, X.509 certificates, Kerberos tickets, SAML tokens,
etc.
As default implementation of an STS from Microsoft uses SAML 1.1 assertions as security
tokens (Malinen 2006). 
A set of security requirements for the deployment have been defined and can be summarized
as follows:
• A high-assurance certificate with logotype which provides identity to a user and is used to
sign the security token.
• Security  Token  Service,  implemented  at  the  IdP  and  can  process  token  requests,
authenticate  users,  creates  tokens,  etc… A  policy  describes  the  token  capabilities  and
binding requirements.
76 Windows CardSpace :en route vers l’identité,
http://www.programmez.com/vista/93_vista_windows_cardspace.pdf
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authentication method to the IP.
The security features of the Cardspace architecture are summarized in (Dorrans 2006):
• All communication links are secure.
• Data encrypted in memory until use
• Store is double encrypted and ACLed
• Service provider can be concealed from the Identity Provider
• Signing key for self-issued tokens varies for each SP
• Users can protect cards with a PIN
• CardSpace runs on a private Windows Desktop like UAC in Vista.
6.4.10 Security of protocols
Figure   10 illustrates the protocol between the different entities of the Windows Cardspace
model.
Figure 10: Overview of the Windows Cardspace model Malinen 2006) 
The steps of the security protocols involved for acquiring a security token and accessing a
service a relying party (Service Provider) are according to (Malinen 2006):
Step1:   relying  party  web  site  redirects  the  client  to  a  login  page  with  embedded
Windows CardSpace tags. These tags include a number of parameters to be passed to
the identity selector, including what information is needed and whether self issued
tokens are accepted.
Step2: when user clicks Windows CardSpace authentication button on the web page,
the  browser’s  CardSpace  support  code  invokes  the  identity  selector  on  the  client
machine.
The identity selector processes the requirements from the relying party and optionally
Step  3:   The  identity  selector  can  request  more  specific  details  about  the  security
policy of the relying party using WS-MetadataExchange. Identity selector then can
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list of choices.
Step 4: user chooses one of the cards and if it is a self issued card, the identity selector
will generate a SAML 1.1 assertion as the security token acting itself as an STS. If the
card represents an identity at one of the IdPs, the identity selector will request a token
using WS-Trust. The tokens that the IdP generates can be of any type the relying party
has declared to accept in its security policy in step 1 and optionally in step 3. These
third party tokens are treated as opaque binary data by the identity selector. The STS
will also generate a proof key for the token and send it together with the token to the
client. 
Step 5: the browser will use HTTP(S)/POST to send the encrypted token along with
proof of possession of the proof key to the relying party. The relying party validates
the message and then creates a session for the user.
6.4.11 Other security aspects
A search in the web resulted in no information concerning infrastructural (layer 1 related)
security  requirements  or  policies  in  CardSpace  and  the  Identity  Metasystem.  Obviously
Microsoft in this respect is relying on already existing white papers concerning server and
client security
77 on the operation systems level.
77 See e.g. http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=90ec8abb-08c7-4706-b730-
9a1f9fcf2d9f&displaylang=en
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This chapter first summarizes some of the salient features of the assessment made in Chapter
6 and then provides some comparative remarks. 
7.1.1 Liberty
Liberty can be considered as a business centric approach to identity management, as it is
based on collaboration between organisations and on an implementation of its specifications
by these organisations. Liberty only provides the specifications for standards-based federated
IdM as well as infrastructural components. Liberty itself does not provide services. Regarding
privacy and possibilities for users to actively manage their (partial) identities, much is left
open   to the implementing organisations. They have to adopt the privacy recommendations
provided  in  (non-normative)  documentations,  such  as  the  ‘Privacy  and  Security  best
Practices’. Customers can therefore not rely on the compliance with these recommendations. 
Digital identities are represented by different accounts that the user may have at different (or
the  same)  identity  providers.  Liberty  provides  means  for  privacy  enhanced  identity
management by offering 'opaque handlers' and allowing for an 'Anonymous Identity Protocol',
yet again whether this is implemented in a concrete case depends on the service provider
implementing Liberty standards.
Regarding  trustworthiness  ('circles  of  trust'),  again,  much  depends  on  the  actual
implementations  and  the  reputation  of  the  implementers.  In  other  words,  trust  levels  for
Liberty implementations can be different as the technology can be implemented differently
and because federations exist out of different organisations. 
Liberty does not require users to download or install additional software: Liberty is server
based.
Authentication in Liberty is based on SAML. Liberty Alliance does not allow for policy
negotiation and enforcement between users and identity/service providers. Concrete policy
management is left to the identity providers and service providers.
Liberty does not provide history management, nor context detection. User Data are stored on
different servers, each containing only partial data.
The Liberty specifications provide ample attention to security aspects, both on an abstract
(e.g., in   Liberty ID-FF Architecture Overview) level, as well as on a more concrete level (e.g.,
(Liberty ID-WSF)).
7.1.2 Shibboleth
Shibboleth is a standards-based, open source software package for web single sign-on across
or  within  organizational  boundaries  that  ‘sits  on  top’  of  an  organisation’s  authentication
technology  and  provides  web  based  single  sign-on  functionality  for  online  resources.
Shibboleth comes from academia predominantly aims at deployment in universities, contexts
in other words, where users and (identity and service) providers 'know' each other and also
have off-line relations. 
In Shibboleth the user is assigned to a so-called   home organisation, which acts as her identity
provider and administers her attributes. Typically, the user will have only one identity for the
services in a federation. 
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provides a certain level of user control over their digital identities.
Because identity federation with Shibboleth is initiated by an organisation with which a user
already has a relation, trustworthiness of the system can be achieved by the reputation of this
organisation,  their  information  provisioning  about  security  towards  the  user,  and  the
agreements they make with the Service Providers that join the federation. 
Authentication requests and assertions are made using the SAML standard. For privacy and
security reasons, assertions are signed with the key of the identity provider and encrypted
with the key of the service provider. Many of the security strengths of Shibboleth rely on the
security considerations of SAML 
7.1.3 PRIME
The  PRIME  IdM  solution  aims  to  be  a  user  centric  and  privacy-enhanced  identity
management  system.  PRIME,  by  default  makes  use  of  anonymous  interactions,  e.g.  by
concealing network addresses of the user. Moreover, the system promotes the use of various
and different partial identities, makes use of advanced cryptography, allows for user policy
negotiation, provides user data tracking, and user assessment of platforms and services.
At the core of the PRIME infrastructure is the PRIME Middleware, which in order to provide
the functionality mentioned above, has to be implemented on server and client alike. The
PRIME  IdM  solution  has  not  been  implemented  in  existing  operating  systems  or  web
browsers yet, which makes a fast adoption of the technology unlikely at present. 
The PRIME console (PRIME Identity Manager), which is the module located at the end-
user’s end, aims to inform the user by means of a standard user interface, which handles all
privacy-related functionality. The interface can take over web-based interfaces so the user has
a consistent (and trusted) experience when it concerns IdM. The   PRIME Identity Manager
allows  the  user  to  administer  her  personal  data  within  PRIME  and  to  configure  various
settings concerning his digital identities.
PRIME allows users to specify and negotiate data handling policies. The   PRIME Identity
Manager checks whether the provided data handling policies from the service provider match
the user’s preferences and, after positive matching, the requested personal data is sent to the
service provider.   Before a user discloses personal data, both the user and the service provider
agree  on  those  data  handling  policies.   The  service  provider's  Middleware  guarantees  for
enforcement of the data handling policy.
In PRIME, personal data of users, including credentials issued by distinct authorities, are
stored on client-side. 
7.1.4 Microsoft Cardspace
Windows CardSpace (‘CardSpace’) is a system that does not mandate a single approach to
digital identity, but aims at being an ‘identity metasystem’.
CardSpace  allows  the  creation  multiple  (partial)  identities,  represented  by  Infocards.  It
distinguishes two basic types of information cards.   Personal cards can hold varying personal
data, e.g., name, e-mail address, date of birth, or similar. This information is encrypted locally
and may be sent to partner websites if necessary. However, the user decides which data should
be revealed to the respective service provider. Personal cards are also called self-issued cards
since the user has also the role of an identity provider in this case. The second type of cards is
called managed cards. These are provided by identity providers.
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Its ‘Identity Selector’, one of the core components of the system, enables the user to make
decisions about her digital identities, on the basis of the ‘information cards’. The underlying
information of a information card can be scrutinized as well. CardSpace's comprehensive user
interface makes it relatively easy to operate by an end-user. The metaphor for digital identities
(the  InfoCard)  is  understandable  to  many  individuals,  and  most  people  will  be  able  to
understand their function, without the necessity of understanding its technical complexity.
The user decides how many and which of her cards may be transmitted to service providers.
Besides necessary data which is requested by the service provider, optional information can
be  included.  Based  on  a   privacy  policy  that  service  providers  should  publish,  users  may
decide to interact with that service provider and to release personal information via cards. The
interface gives insight in the information that will be sent to a service provider. Moreover, it
has the feature of providing the user an overview of the site information and the certificate
that has been issued to the service provider (if any). In order to keep a record of all personal
data that a user has released to service providers, CardSpace stores a history of usage for each
card.
Trustworthiness is taken seriously in Cardspace. Worth mentioning here is the fact that trust is
approached as a mutual concept. Not only individuals have to authenticate, but also   websites
should authenticate themselves to the user. Trustworthiness is also enhanced by means of the
standard user interface and consistent representation of digital identities for all IdM decisions.
Trustworthiness of CardSpace is enhanced by the fact that most users have experience with
Microsoft products.
Because CardSpace is implemented in the Vista operating system and can be used for multiple
other OS’, it is likely that the adoption of this IdM system is potentially high.
User  data  are  encrypted  and  held  client-side,  while  other  data  remains  on  the  servers  of
identity providers. 
Windows  Cardspace  security  model  relies  on  the  idea  of  Infocards  that  describe  a  trust
relationship between a user and a security token service (STS). Windows Cardspace employs
SAML  tokens  and  is  based  on  WS-Trust,  WS-Security,  and  WS-Policy  and  WS-
SecurityPolicy standards for handling these tokens. Its security is strongly tied to the WS-*
efforts led by IBM, Microsoft and Verisign. 
7.1.5 General remarks
What  clearly  shows  when  looking  at  the  four  frameworks  differ  significantly  in  their
approach, focus and maturity. Liberty Alliance and Shibboleth start from an enterprise centric
approach, in  Liberty's case a federation of enterprises, in Shibboleth's case institution(s) of
higher education. The enterprise is the principal party in providing and managing identities.
The individual is the (passive) user. PRIME and to a lesser extent CardSpace depart from the
perspective of the user as the central actor. Here the individual is really at the steering wheel
of her identity management. Both systems allow the user to self create identities, as well as
make use of provisioned, certified identities. The user-centricity also shows in the way users
can define and negotiate policies regarding personal data disclosure and use.
Liberty  and  Shibboleth  already  have  an  extensive  user  base  and  Cardspace,  given  its
Microsoft roots is in an advantageous position. PRIME, which started as a European research
File: 20090506_fidis_D3.12 final 1.0.odt page 70project and hence focused on pushing (privacy) envelopes in this respect lags behind. There is
no off the shelf PRIME implementation.
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Liberty and Shibboleth don't require any download and/or installation on the part of the user.
Liberty is a set of standards that can be implemented by technology providers (on the server-
side of transactions). Shibboleth consists of a package that can be installed on the service
providers  IT  infrastructure.  Both  systems  provide  the  user  with  web  based  authentication
tools. PRIME depends on client and server Middleware for its advanced functionality. This
may  be  an  obstacle  to  widespread  deployment  and  adoption.  Cardspace  also  depends  on
Middleware, but in this case it is tied in major operating systems (Vista and Windows 7),
which facilitates large scale adoption. 
With  respect  to  security  there  are  many  similarities  because  most  systems  use  the  same
underlying mechanisms (SAML), which means they are prone to the same risks. Regarding
trustworthiness  from  the  perspective  of  the  user  there  are  significant  differences.  Liberty
Alliance has to rely on the reputation of a potentially diverse large, and to the user unfamiliar,
set of identity providers as well as relying parties of different stature. Shibboleth currently is
mainly implemented in configurations where the user knows the identity provider (his/her
university  or  school)  as  well  as  the  relying  parties  which  facilitates  the  trust  relation.
Trustworthiness in PRIME has different aspects. On the one hand, identity is very much in the
hands  of  the  user  herself  (which  should  be  trustworthy).  Also,  sophisticated  technology
(cryptography,  anonymous  communication)  should  enhance  the  (technical)  trust  level
significantly  over  other  approaches,  yet  trustworthiness  here  is  undermined  because  the
technology is opaque and unfamiliar to most common users. Do they trust technology they
don't understand? Cardspace is in the same ball-park as PRIME with respect to user-control.
Microsoft has learned from the objections to central data storage by Microsoft in their .NET
Passport project and instead currently uses decentralised storage. This should enhance user
trust in the system. The entire Cardspace environment lives under Microsoft's umbrella. To
most this is a comforting idea, to some it is not.
This is not the place to make verdict regarding the suitability or unsuitability of any approach.
The deliverable aims to provide an overview of a number of different Federated Identity
Management Systems to show that this is a field in flux where different approaches co-exist
and co-evolute, hopefully in a direction that benefits the individual end-user as well as the
federations. 
78 Although the PRIME follow-up project PrimeLife (visit http://primelife.eu) may change this.
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